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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE CYPRUS QUESTION IN THE MAKING 
AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS  
THE CYPRUS QUESTION (1960-1974) 
 
Aslan, Mustafa Çağatay 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Prof. Hakan Kırımlı 
September 2008 
 
In this study, the Soviet attitude towards the Cyprus Question between the 
years 1960-1974 will be analyzed within the framework of Cold War. In this context, 
the reasons of the emergence and development of the Cyprus Question was 
explicated. The differences between Stalin’s foreign policy during the post-Second 
World War and that of post-Stalin period regarding the Third World countries in the 
Middle-East will be emphasized. In this connection, increasing influence of the 
Soviet Union in these countries will be explained with reference to certain related 
treaties. In addition, the developing relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union 
which commenced with the independence of Cyprus in 1960 and further flourished 
as a result of intersecting interests of Makarios and Soviet Union will be explained. 
 iv 
Together with these developed relations, the impact of the Soviet Union on the 
Cyprus Question until 1974 will be examined.  
Key words: Cyprus Question, Soviet Foreign Policy, Greece, Turkey  
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ÖZET 
 
 
KIBRIS SORUNUNUN OLUŞUMU  
ve 
SOVYETLER BİRLİĞİ’NİN KIBRIS SORUNUNA YAKLAŞIMI 
(1960-1974)  
 
Aslan, Mustafa Çağatay 
Master tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Hakan Kırımlı 
September 2008 
 
Bu çalışmada Sovyetler Birliği’nin 1960 ile 1974 yılları arasında Kıbrıs 
Sorunu’na yönelik yaklaşımı Soğuk Savaş konjonktürü içerisinde ele alınmıştır. Bu 
bağlamda, Kıbrıs Sorunu’nun oluşumu ve sorunun zaman içerisinde derinleşmesinin 
nedenlerine değinilmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Stalin dönemi ile Stalin 
sonrası dönemde Sovyetler Birliği’nin Orta Doğu’daki Üçüncü Dünya Ülkeleri’ne 
yönelik izlediği dış politika arasındaki farklılıklar incelenmiştir. Bu cümleden, 1955 
yılı ve sonrasında Sovyetler Birliği’nin bazı üçüncü dünya ülkeleri ile yaptığı 
anlaşmalar ele alınarak, Sovyetler Birliği’nin bu ülkelerde artan nüfuzu irdelenmiştir. 
Bunların yanında, 1960’da Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nin bağımsızlığı ile iki devlet 
 vi 
arasında başlayan ve Sovyetler Birliği ile Makarios’un örtüşen çıkarları sonucunda 
daha da gelişen ilişkiler ele alınmıştır. Gelişen ilişkilerle birlikte, 1960-1974 yılları 
arasında Sovyetler Birliği’nin Kıbrıs Sorunu’na etkisi incelenmiştir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs Sorunu, Sovyet Dış Politikası, Yunanistan, 
Türkiye 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 The root of the Cyprus question was the aim of the Greek Cypriots for 
Enosis.1 This aim stemmed from Hellenic nationalism. The main aim of Hellenic 
nationalism idea was the incorporation of all Greeks in a common state. In this 
connection, the Greek Cypriots desired union with their motherland, Greece.2 The 
Greek Cypriots did not have the opportunity to realize their aims when they were 
under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The coming of the British administration after 
the leasing of the island from the Ottomans entailed an opportunity for the Greek 
Cypriots to achieve Enosis.  However, the Greek Cypriots were not able to 
accomplish Enosis and, at the beginning of the twentieth century, they ironically 
considered the British administrative practices on the island as the main reason for 
this failure. It is, therefore, a necessary to investigate the British intentions on Cyprus 
                                                
1 Enosis: The union of Cyprus with Greece.  
2 During the times of the Grekk independence struggle in 1821, the Greek Cypriots also revolted 
against the Ottoman administration but this rebellion was strictly supressed by the Othooman Empire/ 
For more details on the process of this revolt please see: (Geoorge Hill, The History of Cyprus Vol. 4 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 100, 141. 
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when it leased the island from the Ottomans. Understanding of the logic of the 
British practices on the island requires the emphasizing on deliberations in London 
about the acquisition of the island. The first part of the first chapter was concerns this 
topic. 
 The British practices, supposedly, made the Cyprus question an insoluble 
one. The Greek Cypriots claimed that these practices impeded the embrace of the 
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. They also added that this lack of relationship 
also prevented a solution to the Cyprus dispute. With the aim of investigating of not 
only the accuracy of this allegation but also other factors for the lack of a solution to 
the question, the political annals of the island from 1878 to 1950 will be examined in 
the second part of the first chapter under the title of “The Making of Cyprus 
Problem”. 
 At the beginning of 1950s, the Greek Cypriots dramatically intensified their 
efforts to reach Enosis. As part of these efforts, they chimed in the Greek 
government. The Greek government wanted to find a solution to Cyprus question in 
favor of Enosis through bilateral negotiations with Britain. However, Britain never 
accepted the bilateral negotiations with the Greek government on Cyprus. However, 
the negotiations on Cyprus were, for the first time, initiated in London Conference in 
1955 the participants in which were Britain, Greece, Turkey, and representatives of 
both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. This conference was the first step which paved the 
way for the independence of Cyprus on 16 August 1960. The process between 1955 
and 1960 will be examined in the last part of the first chapter. 
 Understanding of the Soviet attitudes towards the Cyprus question requires 
the emphasis on the evolution in Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World 
countries at the post-Stalin terms. In 1955 and onwards, Soviet interests in the Third 
 3 
World countries dramatically increased. However, the Soviet Union made a few 
commitments in 1950s regarding the Cyprus dispute. The main factor for this was 
that the island was ruled by the British administration until 1960. In the second 
chapter of this study, the logic change in Soviet Foreign policy after the death of 
Joseph Stalin and the attitudes of the Soviet Union regarding Cyprus question during 
the 1950s will be examined.  
 Although the independence of Cyprus was declared on 16 August 1960 on the 
basis of Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, this was, unfortunately, not a 
permanent solution to the question. As a matter of fact, the first crack was seen in 
1962 when President Makarios visited Turkey and sought a confirmation by Turkish 
government for constitutional amendments in order to provide the working of state 
mechanism more effectively. These amendments were vetoed by Turkey, one of the 
guarantors for the independence of Cyprus. After this, the Greek Cypriots attacked 
the Turkish Cypriots. This was the first stage of crisis, which was witnessed in the 
Cyprus Republic. From 1960 to 1974 there were three crisis on the island, in 1964, in 
1967, and in 1974, respectively. These crisis forced Makarios to cooperate with the 
communist world. Makarios’ good terms with the communist world led to the 
dissatisfaction of pro-Enosis circles –both on the island and in Greece- and of the 
West towards Makarios. This dissatisfaction resulted in fractures among Greek 
Cypriots. This disagreement was the most important factor which draw the island 
July 1974 coup d’état. This coup forced the Turkish government to take a decision 
for military intervention as a guarantor of the independence of Cyprus. The growing 
relations of the President Makarios with the communist world, the growing Soviet 
influence on the political life of the island and the Soviet statements on the said crisis 
will be analyzed in the last chapter.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
THE MAKING OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION 
 
 
 
2.1 The Coming of British Administration to Cyprus  
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century one of the most frequently 
discussed matters in Great Britain was how the Empire could secure its 
communication with its colonies. This was regarded as a matter of urgency for the 
welfare of British interests. Most believed this could be achieved only by securing 
trade routes between the Empire and its colonies.3 In addition to this opinion, four 
other important reasons also caused Great Britain to increase its presence in the 
Mediterranean towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
The first reason was the opening of Suez Canal in 1869. This event was a 
turning point for Britain in comprehending the necessity of increasing its influence in 
Eastern Mediterranean. Providing the shortest commercial route to East, the Suez 
                                                
3 Samuel White Baker, Arminius Vambery, “Russia and England: Batumi and Cyprus” Forthnightly 
Review, No. 40:237, (1886, October), p. 372. 
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Canal was vital for British interests. In fact, Britain purchased shares of the Suez 
Canal in 1875.4 This investment also indicates the significance of the Suez Canal for 
Great Britain. Moreover, the route to India through the Suez Canal was the shortest 
and so it was indispensable for military purposes, that is, for the transportation of 
troops to India in case of emergency.5  
The second important reason, as perceived by the British Empire, was the rise 
of the Russian threat which first emerged in the Crimean War and later at the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1870, Russia announced that it would no longer 
obey the principles of neutrality regarding the Black Sea which had been determined 
by the Treaty of Paris in 1856.6 Furthermore, the Russian infiltration of Central Asia 
was gradually becoming a menacing situation for Britain and the latter’s doubts 
concerning Russian intentions in the region increased accordingly. In 1876, the 
Russian Empire constructed a railway to Merv, 240 miles (ca. 387 km) from Herat, 
the key to India.7 In addition, Russia also occupied the port of Batumi on August, 
1878 and which ceased to be a free port in 1886. This was significant because 
Batumi was regarded as an important strategic base for a possible attack to 
Constantinople. 
Relations among the powers of Europe were another reason forcing the Great 
Britain to amplify its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. By the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, Italy and the Austria-Hungarian Empire were allies 
of Great Britain whereas France was trying to repair its damages resulting from its 
                                                
4 Michael Willis, Gladstone and Disraeli: Principles and Policies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 7. 
5 Baker, Vambery, p. 373. 
6 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power   p. 185 . 
7 Vambery, Baker, p. 377. 
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defeat by Prussia in 1870.8 On the other hand, Germany’s main concern was the 
protection of its newly unified structure by focusing on internal unrest. 
The fourth factor was Great Britain’s attitude towards the Ottoman 
suppression of the Serbian and Bulgarian revolts of 1875 and 1876. The Russian 
victory on the Ottoman Empire in 1877-78 wars made it impossible to defend the 
integrity of Ottoman territories in the Balkans both morally and materially.9 
Moreover, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, believed that Russian 
Empire would not settle for occupation of Kars. For Salisbury, the intention of the 
Russians was, as in the case of the Balkans, the agitation of Asian provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire against the Sublime Porte. Nevertheless, the Russian threat had to 
be eliminated to secure Great Britain’s interests. To accomplish this, Salisbury 
suggested that a treaty of alliance between Britain and the Ottoman Empire should be 
signed to defend Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire against Russia 
infiltration.10  
All four of these factors led the British Empire to strengthen its presence in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of possessing Gibraltar and Malta, these alone 
were not sufficient for Great Britain to secure its trade route to India through the 
Suez Canal and to hinder the possible infiltration of Russian influence to the 
Ottoman Asian provinces11. Therefore, it was necessary for Great Britain to establish 
itself in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was, however, a difficult task to find a suitable 
place to serve as a base in the Eastern Mediterranean and there were many 
discussions of this issue in the cabinet.  
                                                
8 Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970), p. 123.  
9 Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World 1850-1986, (London, Boston: Allen & Wollen, 
1987), p. 39. 
10 Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, Henry Layard’ın İstanbul Elçiliği, (Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Basım Evi, 
1968) p. 77. 
11 Vambery, Baker, p. 374. 
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In the meantime, due to economic problems, the Sublime Porte sent a 
dispatch to Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in London, to inquire the 
possibility of borrowing a loan from British Empire. Upon hearing this request, 
Disraeli dispatched a letter to Henry Layard, the British ambassador in 
Constantinople, indicating that financial assistance could be rendered as soon as the 
Ottoman Empire consented to sell a territory to Britain in conformity with British 
interests.12 At the same time with Musurus Pasha’s unequivocal declaration of the 
Ottoman loan credit to Great Britain, the cabinet nominated Colonel Home to draw 
up a report on which location in the Eastern Mediterranean was most suitable. When 
Home completed his report, he established with three important criteria. First, the 
British Empire should occupy a place of which public would not rebel owing to the 
transfer of its administration from the Sublime Porte to Great Britain. Moreover, the 
wealth of the place in terms of raw materials should be useful to Great Britain. 
Secondly, with respect to its military value, troops in the region should be easily 
transferrable to the battlefield in the case of an attack by Russian armies on the 
Ottoman Asian provinces. Lastly, for economic reasons, that place should be usable 
by British producers as a depository to facilitate their trade in Middle East.13 
In the light of Home’s criteria, Cyprus appeared to be the most suitable place 
for British occupation. Indeed, there were limited choices for the British in the 
region. One was Crete, but the Cretan insurrection had been suppressed nearly a 
decade earlier in 1869, and a new change of administration might have encouraged 
the insurrection once again. The second possibility was Egypt. The occupation of 
Egypt might have caused deterioration in the relations between Great Britain and 
                                                
12 Kurat, Henry Layard’ın İstanbul Elçiliği, p. 78. 
13 ibid, pp. 82,83. 
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France.14 Malta was not sufficient due to its remoteness from any immediate military 
intervention against a Russian attack on Ottoman lands in Asia.   
 Finally, Prime Minister Disraeli ordered Henry Layard to begin negotiations 
with Sublime Porte over Cyprus. At the conclusion of these negotiations, the 
Ottoman Empire and the Great Britain agreed to sign a secret treaty foreseeing the 
leasing of the island to Britain and the transfer of its administration from the 
Ottoman Empire to Britain. In return, Great Britain guaranteed military and 
economic support to the Ottoman Empire in case of an attack by Russia. Thus, on 10 
July 1878, a British man of war, HMS Salamis, delivered an edict to the governor of 
Cyprus, Besim Pasha. The edict specified that the island’s administration was to be 
temporarily ceded to British officials.15         
 The British manner towards the island directly affected not only the fate of 
the Cyprus, but also the attitudes of its population both to the outer world and to each 
other in the years to follow. It is therefore necessary to consider the deliberations in 
Great Britain over the acquisition of the island and the perceptions and reactions of 
the island’s peoples to their new ruler at the beginning of its administration. 
 The acquisition of Cyprus was not an entirely new project for the British 
Empire. In 1814, a Scottish official of the East India Company, J.M. Kinneir 
supposed that if Cyprus was taken by the British forces, then the Empire would be 
the unquestioned sovereign of the Mediterranean.16 Additionally, in 1847 in his novel 
Tancred, Disraeli also supported Kinneir’s ideas regarding Cyprus.17 There was, 
                                                
14 Indeed, the Great Britain occupied Egypt in 1881. To prevent possible uneasiness relations between 
France and Great Britain, the latter declared that it would remain blind to French ambitions over 
Tunisia. Some historians regarded that event as one of the important factors for the beginning of 
‘Scramble for Africa’ process from onward years. (see: Michael Wills, pp. 7,8.     
15 Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, “1878 Kıbrıs Konvansiyonu ve Enosis Kıvılcımları”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi 
Dün /Bugün/ Yarın, Sayı 89,  (Haziran, 2004), p. 74.  
16 Kurat, Henry Layard…, p. 76. 
17 Harold Temperley, “ Disraeli and Cyprus” , The English Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 182 (April, 
1931), p. 274. 
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however, some opposition to this idea. Discussions on the subject stemmed from 
different understandings of foreign policy by leading British political figures. The 
nature of these discussions can be understood by considering their different opinions.  
First, it is important to examine Disraeli’s ideas of foreign policy. He was in 
favor of increasing the prestige of Great Britain in the world politics. In his view, the 
only way to gain such prestige was to shift from policy of isolation to one of 
intervention in world affairs.18 Therefore he advocated that the Empire should not be 
quiescent against the Russian threat. It was necessary, therefore, to hinder Russian 
infiltration into Asian territories of the Ottoman Empire. In one of his addresses in 
1876, Disraeli stated that if the Russians possessed Constantinople, which Disraeli 
regarded as a key to India by, this might result in losing India.19 Disraeli regarded the 
Ottoman Empire as a buffer zone between Great Britain and Russia. To demonstrate 
this, it is sufficient to consider his words in another speech to House of Lords in 
1879:               
“….We wished to maintain Turkey as an independent political State. 
It is very easy to talk of the Ottoman power being at the point of 
extinction. But when you come practically to examine the question 
there is no living statesman who has ever offered or propounded to 
any practical solutions to the difficulties which would occur if the 
Ottoman Empire were to fall to pieces…..”20 
 
 Another significant personality in Parliament, William Gladstone, sharply 
criticized Disraeli’s ideas and labeled them as ‘Beaconsfieldism’ which he 
understood to be the evil of British imperial interests.21 Indeed, Gladstone desired the 
preservation of peace throughout Europe and was in favor of following a non-
aggressive foreign policy. Instead of adopting a unilateral foreign policy, he 
                                                
18 Porter, p. 38. 
19 Willis, p. 90 
20 ibid, p. 90. 
21 ibid, p. 7. 
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preferred to act within the Concert of Europe.22 Congruent with his thoughts on 
foreign policy Gladstone was strictly opposed to the acquisition of Cyprus and he 
criticized the overemphasis on trade routes to India because of the possibility of 
driving a wedge between the European powers.23 Furthermore, Gladstone viewed the 
Cyprus Convention of 1878, as an ‘insane covenant’ and repeated his criticisms on 
the acquisition of Cyprus when he came to power in 1880, saying that the island 
provided no benefits to Great Britain in terms of either military or political interest.24   
 There was also conflict between two other important British statesman, Lord 
Derby and Lord Salisbury, the successive Foreign Secretaries in Disraeli’s cabinet. 
Derby was averse to Disraeli’s ambitions. In one of his meetings with Salisbury, he 
complained about Disraeli’s interventionist policy, claiming that this policy might 
result in a general war in Europe. He especially criticized Disraeli’s attempt to 
acquire Cyprus in return for undertaking a secret commitment to the defense of the 
Ottoman Empire. In fact, Derby believed that Cyprus was not useful. Instead, he 
thought it would cause more trouble to the Empire.25 On the other hand, Derby’s 
suspicions were aroused by the rise of Russia as a threat, especially after the San 
Stefano Treaty in 1878 as a result of which some of his opinions changed, but he still 
opposed the acquisition of Cyprus. He believed that the alliance between Great 
Britain and Austrian-Hungary would be enough to hinder the emergence of the 
Russian Empire as the sole power in the Balkans. Even if this cooperation did not 
deter Russia and it became determined to take further steps, Derby believed Great 
                                                
22 John F. Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone and Disraeli Era 1866-1880,(Standford, 
California: Standford University Press, 1997),  p. 14. 
23 Willis p. 7. 
24 John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection, p. 9.  
25 Bernard Porter, p. 40. 
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Britain take an interest in Crete or Egypt instead of Cyprus both to secure routes to 
India and to deter Russia.26  
On the other hand, Salisbury envisioned that British foreign policy should be 
practiced for the protection of British territories, British properties, and British 
lives.27 Additionally, as previously mentioned, Salisbury believed that Russia would 
take further steps after 1878 to increase its ascendency not only in the Balkans but 
also in Eastern Anatolia, so would create an imminent crisis for British interests in 
these regions. To avoid this possibility, Salisbury believed Great Britain should 
increase its influence in these regions, especially with the assistance of merchants, 
travelers, soldiers, and on the like. Salisbury thought that developing British 
influence with this method would entail the right of access to these regions and he 
that “once getting right of access, in a few years it would be resulted in a conquest 
without even drawing a sword”.28 Like Disraeli, Salisbury regarded the occupation of 
Cyprus as necessary for the protection of British interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. In other words, he considered the island as one of links in the chain 
which had to be secured from Gibraltar to India. In Salisbury’s opinion, a base on 
Cyprus would facilitate a counter-attack on any Russian advance on Constantinople 
or Eastern Anatolia.29 Therefore, he advocated for the Cyprus Convention of 1878 
and justified it as necessary for securing the British interests in the region. Salisbury 
was also convinced of the idea of making reforms to strengthen the Asian provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire and, according to the same logic, he thought that Cyprus 
might be an example for other provinces of the region under Ottoman rule.30       
                                                
26 Kenneth Bourne, p. 133.  
27 David Gillard, ‘Lord Salisbury’ in British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy, ed. by Keith M. 
Wilson, (London: Croom Helm Press, 1987), p. 123. 
28 ibid, p. 132. 
29 Kenneth Bourne, p. 135. 
30 ibid, p. 136. 
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It is tried to shed light on the diversity of opinion with respect to the 
acquisition of Cyprus by Great Britain by considering the different views of 
important British statesmen. However, considering the issue of acquisition on the 
individual level may be misleading in understanding the main rationale for Britain’s 
acquisition of the island. Therefore it is, necessary to focus on the general British 
approach towards the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
 Digestion of general British manner towards Ottomans during this period 
requires emphasizing on the British policy during the times of Crimean war. As in 
the later case of the 1877-78 wars between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, Great 
Britain had decided to support the Ottomans against Russians during the Crimean 
War. This policy was mainly formulated by Lord Palmerston, the Home Secretary, 
then and later became Prime Minister during the years 1855-1858 and 1859-1865. 31 
Actually, the British policy towards Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 was the 
recurrence of that of the Crimean War years. To be sure, Great Britain followed this 
policy to pursue its own interests on the Eastern question and to protect them against 
the Russian threat. Indeed, the Queen expressed the traditional policy of Great 
Britain in her own words. In one of her speeches she supported Disraeli and on the 
acquisition of Cyprus by saying that: “High and low are delighted, except Mr. 
Gladstone who is frantic”.32 Additionally, in another speech on 19 April 1877, she 
explained that “It [the acquisition of Cyprus] is not the question of upholding 
Turkey; it is the question of Russian and British supremacy in the world”.33 
Furthermore, although Galdstone was not a pro-war statesman, he ordered the 
                                                
31 Willis, p. 78. 
32 Reddaway, p. 9. 
33 P.J. Polo, ‘Lord Derby’, in British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to 
First World War,  ed. Keith M. Wilson, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 111. 
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bombing of Alexandria and the occupation of Egypt in 1882.34 Like Cyprus, Egypt 
was also a link in the chain securing the route from Gibraltar to India and occupied in 
accordance with British interests despite Gladstone’s inclinations.  
 Whatever the extent of deliberation in Britain, at last, the Empire took over 
the administration of the island. Britain played a key role in determining the fate of 
the island in the following years. As previously mentioned, the first reaction of the 
people of Cyprus to their new masters and the practices of British administration 
needs to be examined to understand the British role in the making of the Cyprus 
problem. 
 
 
 
2.2. The Making of the Cyprus Problem 
 
 On 12 July 1878, the British flag was run up at Nicosia and ten days after the 
first saluting of the British flag, the first High Commissioner of the island, Sir Garnet 
Wolseley, arrived at Larnaca.35  The arrival of British administration on the island 
was interpreted by the Greek population of the island as the first step toward the 
union of the island with Greece. Actually, the Greeks had a good cause to expect 
this, because after fifty years of administration the Britain had ceded the Ionian 
Islands taken from Napoleon in 1814 to Greece in 1864. The Greeks, therefore, 
believed that Cyprus would also be ceded by the British Empire. At the welcoming 
ceremony for Wolseley, the Bishop of Kition,36 Kyprionos, specified that the Greek 
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population confided in British administration for its assistance in the realization of 
Enosis.37 On the other hand, with few exceptions, there was no serious opposition 
against British administration among the Turkish Cypriots. 
 The first administrative innovation implemented by Great Britain was the 
formulation of a constitution. This did not satisfy the Greek population, however, and 
expressed their reactions to this constitution in 1879 and 1881.38 Due to these 
reactions, in 1882, Gladstone, who had come to power in 1880, ordered the 
modification of the first constitution. The constitution of 1882 was regarded as the 
most liberal and democratic among those of other British colonies. The constitution 
established two Councils. The first was the Legislative Council. This consisted of 18 
members and the distribution of the number of members was determined according 
to the ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the population as a whole. 
Consequently, nine members were elected among the Greek population, and three 
members from the Turks. The other six members were officials assigned by Britain. 
The High Commissioner presided over the Legislative Council and possessed the all-
important right of veto.39 The second institution established by the constitution was 
an Executive Council. It consisted of three members, of whom two were Greek and 
one was a Turk. There was a hierarchical relationship between these two councils, 
the Legislative Council being superior to the Executive Council. Any decision 
regarding the island had to be approved by the Legislative Council. On the other 
hand, Executive Council’s only role was to make recommendations to the High 
Commissioner. But the High Commissioner was not bound by these 
recommendations.40   
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Although the constitution was one of the most liberal among those of other 
British colonies, it did not meet the demands of Greek population. With the 
formation of an alliance between the British members and Turkish members, the 
Greek majority in the Legislative Council could be counterbalanced and due to the 
fact that the deciding vote was in the hands of High Commissioner, such an alliance 
could counteract the will of the Greek councilors ten to nine. Thus it was not possible 
for Greeks to pass a bill through the Legislative Council on their own initiative. In 
1887-88 the Greeks staged demonstrations to demand the withdrawal of veto power 
from the High Commissioner. The British authorities ignored these demonstrations 
and no amendments were made in the articles of constitution related to the 
Legislative Council.41 
The most important reaction on the part of the Greek population to the 
formation of the Legislative Council came in 1912. Winston Churchill, as the Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies, had occasion to visit Cyprus in 1911, at which 
time the Greek population transmitted their demands for Enosis to Churchill. 
However he unequivocally rejected the demands of Greeks and stated that the British 
Administration had to respect the sensitivities of both communities on the island. 
Therefore, the British administration could not allow the Greek population to achieve 
Enosis by ignoring the feelings of the Turkish Cypriots. Following this response, in 
April 1912 Greeks once again organized demonstrations in major cities such as 
Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol. The British had no difficulty in suppressing the 
demonstrations in Nicosia and Larnaca. Nevertheless, the riots in Limassol could 
scarcely be under controlled and police attacked the demonstrators resulting in some 
deaths. In the aftermath the Greek members of the Legislative Council resigned.42  
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From 1878 to 1912 the Greek population’s demands for Enosis were 
delivered to British officials many times, all of which were rejected. Interestingly, 
the British never stated that British rule in the island was temporary and that the de 
jure sovereign of the island was the Sultan.   
The beginning of the First World War in 1914 was a turning point for the 
history of the Cyprus. Upon the Ottoman entry into the war on the side of Germany, 
the British Empire unilaterally declared the annexation of the island.43 This 
annexation entailed no amendments in the constitution in the way acceding to Greek 
demands. However in 1915 Cyprus was offered to Greece in return for joining the 
war on the side of Entente powers. 44 The British government asked Greece to 
reinforce the Entente powers in Serbia in return for Cyprus. The Prime Minister of 
Greece, Alexander Zaimis, stated that Greek support to Entente Powers in Serbia 
would be ineffective and would destroy Greece. Instead of sending troops to Serbia, 
Greek government’s intention was to deploy its troops in Asia Minor. The Greek 
govenment, therefore, rejected this offer. Although the Prime Minister, Zaimis, was 
criticized for the rejecting of the offer, the main author of this refusal was 
Constantine.45 Although Greece voiced its demand for Enosis at the Versailles 
negotiations, Britain rejected Greeks’ request in 1919 and the island remained in the 
possession of Britain.46  
The Greek Cypriots persisted in their demands for amendments in the 
Legislative Council, Having been rejected time and again by the British, the Greek 
                                                
43 As it is known the unilateral annexation of the island was recognized by Ankara Government on 
July 1923 with signing of Lausanne Treaty. 
44 George Hill, p. 426. 
45. For more detalied information on the process of the offer of Cyprus to Greece please see: C.M. 
Woodhouse, “The Offer of Cyprus: October 1915” in Greece and Great Britain During World War I 
(Thessaloniki: Institute For Balkan Studies, 1985) pp. 77-97.     
46 William Mallinson, A Modern History of Cyprus (New York: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2005),p.11. 
 17 
members once again withdrew from Legislative Council in December 1920, but this 
did not bring about a concrete solution to the Greek demands.47  
In 1921, a census was held on the island. According to this census, the 
population of the Cyprus was 310,709. Apart from small groups of Armenians and 
Latin, Greek Cypriots formed the bulk of the population while Turkish Cypriots 
comprised one-fifth of the total.48 This was a hopeful indication for Greek Cypriots 
on the issue of making amendments to the constitution for the re-allocation of 
membership in the Legislative Council. Greek Cypriots made a new offer to the 
British officials to amend in the constitution in 1922. They requested that the number 
of Greek members in the Legislative Council had to be increased from nine to twelve 
in accordance with the result of last census. This request was once again rejected by 
the British in 1923, who claimed that such an amendment would be possible only if 
the number of British officials on Legislative Council was increased from six to nine. 
The British admitted that it would otherwise create great concern for the Turkish 
Cypriots. Furthermore, the defeat of the Greek armies in Anatolia by the Turkish 
forces in 1922 led to the scaling down of the Greek Cypriots demands for Enosis for 
a time.49 
In 1925, the British declared Cyprus to be a Crown Colony. In addition to this 
a constitutional amendment was put into force and the number of Greek members 
was raised to twelve, while the number of British officials was correspondingly 
increased to nine. Although the number of the Turkish Cypriots on the council 
remained the same, the increased number of British officials provided the 
                                                
47 George Hill, p. 425. 
48 Tindall, p. 94. 
49 George Hill, p. 426, 427. 
 18 
counterbalancing of the Greek Cypriots in the Council, despite the fact that they were 
the majority on the island.50     
With the encouragement of Communist Party in Greece, established in 1924, 
Nicholas Othon Yiavopolos initiated a communist movement on Cyprus in 1925, 
which proved to be a critical year for the political history of the island. He 
established a worker’s union and this became the basis of the first communist party 
of Cyprus, Kommonistikon Komma Kyprou (KKK). However, towards the end of 
1925 Yiavopolos was found guilty for violating public order on the island and was 
exiled to Greece. His successor was Kostas Skeleas whose leadership lasted for a 
short time. Haralambos Vatiliotis returned to the island in 1925 from Moscow to 
become the leader of the party and Skeleas became his deputy.51 The first communist 
party was not be effective in shaping policy on the island. The primary reason for 
this failure was the enormous significance of the church on Cyprus.52 Still, the 
endeavors of KKK continued until 1933 and in 1931 it played important role in the 
outbreak riots on the island.   
As already mentioned, the constitutional amendment of 1925 did not satisfy 
the demands of Greek Cypriots. Additionally from 1925 till 1931, the British 
officials ignored the applications of Greek Cypriots to Britain. In 1931, the Governor 
submitted a proposal to the Legislative Council to impose a supplementary tax of 
five percent on official salaries over a hundred pounds. 53 The Legislative Council 
voted on the proposal and it was refused by thirteen to eleven votes. This vote was 
remarkable in the history of Cyprus because for the first time a Turkish member of 
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the Legislative Council made an alliance with the Greek members. This Turkish 
member, therefore, was labeled as the ‘Thirteenth Greek’. Although the Legislative 
Council did not approve the proposal, the Governor enforced it by an order in 
council. This governor’s attitude was the straw that broke the camel’s back for the 
Greek Cypriots. Upon bypassing the decision of the Legislative Council, the Bishop 
of Kition54, unilaterally declared the Enosis on October.55 To be sure, this declaration 
was not recognized by Britain. This British manner resulted in the outbreak of riots 
in the island on 21 October 1931. British officials took strict measures to suppress 
the riot.  
One of the short-term effects of the 1931 riots was the abolishment of the 
Legislative Council by the Letters Patent of 12 December 1931. At this time the 
function of the Legislative Council was granted to the Governor.56 In a certain sense 
the Executive Council57 replaced the Legislative Council,58 but its decisions were 
advisory and the Governor did not have to obey its recommendations. The second 
short-term consequence was the banning of the Communist Party and the deportation 
its leaders, Haralambos Vatiliotis and Kostas Skeleas. Two bishops held responsible 
for the outbreak of riots were also exiled.59 1n 1933, the Criminal Law of the island 
was restructured and the new law empowered government authorities to ban the 
communist formations. On the following day the Communist Party was banned and 
seven agencies related to the Communist party were declared illegal.60 Until the 
independence of the island in 1960, Cyprus was mainly ruled by decree. Although 
the British officials supposedly endeavored to consider the sensitivities of the 
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Cypriots in their actions, the administration of the island was undemocratic and 
authoritarian.61   
After the dissolution of the Legislative Council, the Executive Council 
remained as the sole institution in the administration of the island. However, it was 
very difficult for Greek Cypriots to serve on the Executive Council. The Greek 
members were attacked by pro-Enosis Greeks as ‘Sir Traitors’ or as ‘imperialist 
lackeys’ by the Communists.62  In 1934 a leading figure on the Executive Council, A. 
Triantaphyllides, who was also a former member of the Legislative Council, was 
assassinated due to his advocacy of cooperation with the British officials.63  
Between 1934 and 1939 there were also endeavors in London to support the 
aims pro-Enosis Cypriots. In 1937, a ‘Committee for Cyprus’ was established in 
London by overt supporters of Enosis. Moreover, in the summer of 1937, a 
commission was established to convince the Colonial Office to withdraw from the 
island and to allow the unification with Greece. As in previous years, however, the 
Colonial Office once again emphatically rejected the suggestion of the commission. 
The Committee for Cyprus prepared a constitutional draft and presented it to the 
Colonial Office as its new constitution, revoked after 1931 riots. However these 
efforts were not successful.64 Some groups in London also bolstered the Communist 
movement on Cyprus. In June 1937, a document captured by police officers on 
Cyprus revealed that, the Communist activities on the island was being espoused by 
the British Communist Party Center, not just by Moscow65 Although communist 
activities were forbidden in 1933 with banning of Communist Party, the party’s 
operations had shifted underground. To be sure, after 1931 the communist efforts 
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were not as intensive as they had been before1931. These underground efforts were 
led by two brothers, named Ploutis Loizou Savvides, generally known as Ploutis 
Servas, and Hristos Savvides.66        
The beginning of the Second World War entailed drastic changes for the 
political history of Cyprus. After the British declaration of war on Germany, 
approximately 37,000 Cypriots – one-third of this figure representing Turkish 
Cypriots- were conscripted into the army. After the defeat of Germany, the Greek 
Cypriots once again expressed their hopes for Enosis. They believed that the Cypriot 
contribution in the course of Second World War would convince the Britain to make 
some concessions towards Enosis. In fact, in 1941, the Greek Foreign Minister asked 
his British opposite number to cede the island to Greece in return for Greek support 
given to Britain in the war. This request, however, was rejected.67 On the other hand, 
the real resistance in Greece against Germany was formed by communists rather than 
nationalists. The latter preferred to cooperate with the Nazi occupation.68 This 
resulted in the growth  of communist power in Greece which would soon lead to civil 
war. The rising power of communists in Greece unavoidably reflected in Cyprus. In 
1941, the banned Communist Party of Cyprus was reestablished under the name of 
AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou) and the purposes of its program 
were “the support of war, the satisfaction of the immediate and pressing economic 
demands of the people, the granting of political and civil freedom in the island, and 
the abrogation of decrees of the ‘dictatorship’. Consequently, AKEL gained support 
in the municipal elections of 1943 which were held for the first time since the 1931 
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riots.69 This success was one of the perplexing statements in the British Foreign 
Secretary’s rejection of his counterpart in Greece. The former argued that both in 
Greece and in Cyprus communism was making great strides and the cession of the 
island to Greece would result in the victory of communists in Greek civil war.70 
Not surprisingly, the Church was uneasy about the rise of communism in 
Cyprus. With the aim eliminating the communist threat, the Church encouraged the 
establishment of a right-wing political party which would to be overtly supported by 
the Church. Consequently, the Nationalist Party was established in 1947.71 The end 
of civil war in Greece and the establishment of Nationalist Party caused a sharp 
political division among Greek Cypriots. This division was manifested in the 
celebration of Greek Independence Day on 25 March 1948. The two parties 
organized their own celebrations separately in which the Nationalist Party was the 
hard-line supporter of Enosis, and the Communist Party offered to cooperate with 
Greek guerrilla movement.72 By 1949, the defeat of Communism and the banning of 
any communist activities in Greece helped the Nationalist Party to increase its 
influence on the island and led to a reduction in the AKEL votes relative to the 1943 
municipal elections. In Cyprus the threat of communism seemed to have been 
averted by 1949. In the municipal elections of 1949, the pro-Enosis Nationalist Party 
received sixty percent of the votes. Still, AKEL retained the offices of mayors in 
Limassol, Larnaca, and Famagusta.73          
The aspirations of Greek Cypriots for Enosis since the leasing of the island to 
Britain in 1878 and the communists’ efforts to import communism caused a great 
deal of anxiety among the Turkish Cypriots, especially in terms of their security on 
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the island. As previously mentioned, the anxiety of the Turkish Cypriots was 
manipulated by British officials as an pretext for their resistance to demands for 
Enosis As a result of this anxiety, in 1943 the Turkish Cypriots established the Kıbrıs 
Adası Türk Azınlıklar Kurumu (The Turkish Minority Institution of Cyprus) with the 
aim of preventing Enosis. Moreover, since 1940 the Turkish Cypriots lobbied in 
Turkey to attract its attention to the situation of the Turkish Cypriots.74        
It is clear that since 1878, the main ethnic group on the island, Greeks, for the 
most part followed the policy of Enosis. As a reaction to this, the other significant 
ethnic group, the Turkish Cypriots, formed an alliance with the British to block the 
Greek majority. The alliances constructed in the Legislative Council between the 
British and the Turkish Cypriots are the most straightforward examples of British 
and Turkish Cypriot cooperation. The Greeks generally blamed Britain and alleged 
that due to the unfair distribution of the number of members in the Legislative 
Council, the Turkish Cypriots could hinder the Greek aims but, on the other hand, 
this situation also prevented the merging of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
The Greek Cypriots regarded this policy as a classic imperial ‘divide and rule’ 
policy, deliberately followed by the British administration to prevent the 
development of a sense of solidarity.75 This accusation, however, seems to be 
exaggerated. Although the alliances of the British officials and the Turkish Cypriot 
members in the Legislative Council might have been one of the factors averting the 
development of solidarity among the island’s peoples, it should be kept in mind that 
the roots of the absence of political cordiality goes back to the years before than the 
British occupation. After all, one can trace the roots of the Enosis movement 
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nourished by the Hellenic nationalist ideas to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.76 
More importantly, the political history of Cyprus prevented the emergence of 
modernization which could have been a factor in linking the island’s different 
inhabitants. The lack of a process of modernization on Cyprus resulted in the 
strengthening of ethnic self-consciousness. This situation can be clearly seen, for 
example, during the War of 1919-1922 between the Greeks and the Turks in 
Anatolia. At the end of the war, while the Turkish Cypriots were celebrating 
Turkey’s victory over Greece, the Greek Cypriots were in despair.77 From this 
perspective the lack of modernization and the unimpeded growth of nationalist 
feelings not only led to the emergence of the Cyprus question, but also deepened the 
roots of the problem. As at 1950 the Cyprus problem was becoming an issue which 
would make the NATO countries uncomfortable within the context of the Cold War.  
 
 
2.3. Efforts for the Internationalization of Cyprus Problem and Road to 
Independence  
 
 In November 1949, the Greek Orthodox Church decided to hold a referendum 
to prove the determination of the peoples of Cyprus for Enosis.78 The result of this 
referendum, which was not recognized by the British government, indicated that the 
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95 % of the voters were in favor of Enosis.79 After the referendum, the Greeks 
claimed that this rate demonstrated, apart from the Greeks themselves, there were 
others who supported the idea of Enosis. This claim, however, could have been 
accurate if only the turnout of the referendum was near a hundred percent. There 
was, however, no clear documents explaining the real turnout rate of the referendum. 
It would be, therefore, an illogical conclusion that, some of the Turkish Cypriots 
were advocates of Enosis, just by considering the result of this referendum. At the 
time, the Turkish government regarded the referendum meaningless and unnecessary 
attempt of Greek Cypriots and stressed that it was contradictory to the international 
law, since it ignored the rest of the people of the island.80 The Turkish government’s 
approach to that issue revealed a parallelism to that of the British government in 
terms of labeling the referendum as an unofficial one. Therefore, there was no reason 
for the parties of the Cyprus Question to recognize or to obey the putative result of 
the referendum. Furthermore, the British and Turkish officials even tended to deny 
the existence of a Cyprus problem, no matter how dreadfully the Greek Cypriots 
dreadfully endeavored to promulgate it. For instance, Fuad Köprülü, then, the foreign 
minister of Turkey, explained that Turkey had not evaluated the situation in Cyprus 
as a dispute.81 
Towards the end of 1950, a priest of Kitium, Mihail Hristodulu Muskosthe 
was elected by the Greek Cypriots as the Archbishop with the name Makarios III. At 
the ceremony organized for the sake of his inauguration he declared that,  
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“‘I take the Holy Oath that I shall work for the birth of our national 
freedom and shall never waver from our policy of uniting Cyprus to 
Mother Greece.’”82 
 
After Makarios’ oath, another explanation came from Greece, which is 
important for the process of Cyprus question. In February 1951, the Greek Prime 
Minister, Sofokles Venizelos, officially explained that the unification of the Cyprus 
to Greece was a necessity.83 
The most outstanding event of 1952 for the fate of the Cyprus question was 
the election of Marshal Alexandros Papagos as the Prime Minister of Greece 
replacing Venizelos. Papagos was one of the fervently pro-Enosis politicians in 
Greece, and in his election plank, he declared that he would take the Cyprus question 
to the agenda of the United Nations.84 His promise, however, was not an easy one to 
keep, as the internationalization of the question required logical pretexts. 
Furthermore, especially under the conditions of the Cold War, a direct application to 
the UN without any plausible pretext would lead to resentment of the Western Bloc. 
The United States, naturally, was also against the carrying of the question to the UN. 
First of all, if the question was to be discussed in the UN, then Soviet Union would 
have a chance to meddle in the affairs of the island thanks to its seat in the Security 
Council. Besides, it may lead to a conflict within NATO. It is usually argued that 
Washington mainly supported the British government on the issue and encouraged 
them to solve the problem among the three parties (Greece, Turkey ad the United 
Kingdom) of the question. Therefore, Papagos decided to negotiate on the Cyprus 
question with the Foreign Secretary of British government, Anthony Eden. Papagos 
had a chance to talk with him in September 1953. Eden commented to him that there 
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was no Cyprus Question in the agenda of the British Foreign Policy and Her 
Majesty’s Government did not have any intention to leave the island.85 
On the other hand, Greece insisted that the question should be solved either 
by an international mediation or by mutual negotiations between Greece and the 
United Kingdom. The denial of considering Cyprus as a conflict by Turkey, created 
the impression that Turkey did not want to be a party to the question. In this 
connection, the Greek Government might have postponed to apply to the United 
Nations for the solution of the problem in early 1950s. Nevertheless, the first blow to 
the possibility for the beginning of bilateral negotiations between Greece and Britain 
occurred when Papagos and Eden met in London in 1953. More destructive blow 
came with the declaration of Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for Colonial 
Affairs. In his address to the House of Commons in July 1954, he mentioned that 
some colonial lands could not be abandoned by Britain because of their strategic 
importance. Therefore, the peoples of these lands should not have expected to be 
independent. It was quite clear that Hopkinson was talking about Cyprus since with 
the Suez Treaty, signed almost at the same time with the speech of Hopkinson, the 
withdrawal of the British forces from Egypt was became ascertained.86 Furthermore, 
it was also decided by the British government that the British forces in Egypt were 
going to be transferred to Cyprus and this transfer of forces was performed in 
October 1955.87  
As mentioned above, Greece had tried to make a bilateral deal with the 
British government over the Cyprus question. All of its efforts, however, proved 
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fruitless. The Greek government then decided to carry the question to the agenda of 
the UN.88 Consequently, the Greek government declared in 23 March 1954 that it 
would make an official application to UN. 89 On 24 September 1954, at the UN 
General Assembly, the official application of Greece was polled, to decide whether it 
should be put on the agenda of the General Assembly or not. The application was 
accepted to put on the agenda by 30 to 19 with 11 abstentions.90 This decision led to 
the Turkish resentment and it was highly criticized in the country. The Turkish 
representative in the UN, Selim Sarper, suggested that, according to the UN Charter, 
UN does not have right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states and Cyprus was 
a British colony91. In other words, Cyprus was the internal problem of Britain. In this 
connection the Turkish government believed that the application was going to be 
rejected in the meeting of the General Assembly in December of the same year.92 
This explanation indicates that at the time Turkey still disinclined to see the Cyprus 
Problem as an international issue. On 14 December 1954, the UN Assembly 
gathered. At the beginning of its session, Leslie Know Munro, delegate of New 
Zealand in the UN, presented a new proposal not to negotiate the Cyprus Question in 
the Assembly. In accordance with the procedure of the UN, the proposal was polled 
and the result was different from that of September. This time the draft of New 
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Zeland was accepted by 28 to 15 with 16 abstentions.93 Thus, the Cyprus Question 
was not discussed in the UN in 1954.  
In September of 1955, Greece once again applied to the UN to bring the 
Question to the agenda of the UN. The application was polled in the General 
Committee after the representatives of Turkey, United Kingdom and Greece had 
been listened. The General Committee decided by 7 to 4 and 4 abstentions to 
recommend the General Assembly not to put the Question in its agenda and the 
recommendation was confirmed in the UN Assembly by 28 votes to 22 with 10 
abstentions.94 It is important to remind that in May 1955, Britain decided to organize 
a conference in London to discuss the future of the island with the governments of 
Greece and Turkey.95 This attempt of the British government might have led to the 
refusal of Greek application both in General Committee and General Assembly in 
September 1955. 
By 1955, the British policy towards Cyprus question began to display 
important changes. One of the factors for this alteration in the British policy on 
Cyprus was The United States’ pressure on British government. The USA regarded 
Cyprus question as an important problem, and insisted that the conflicts should have 
been worked out by negotiations among the British, Turkish and Greek governments. 
It was obvious that the USA worried that the problem was reaching a deadlock, 
which might have resulted in the splitting of the two NATO members, Turkey and 
Greece.96 This potential splitting would be a serious blow to the NATO policies 
against the communist threat. The USA, therefore, encouraged the British 
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government for the convening of a conference with the participation of the three 
parties, Britain, Greece and Turkey. Other factor was the ascending violence on the 
island which was mainly organized by a group called as Ethniki Organosis Kyprion 
Agoniston (EOKA)97. Last factor for this policy changing was the abrasive presence 
of communism on the island, as represented by AKEL.  
In 1951, Colonel Grivas and Socrates Loizidis had come up with an idea that, 
the political pressure for Enosis should be conducted by an armed struggle on the 
island. Since 1948, Colonel Grivas had been studying this idea and finally he met 
with Makarios in July 1951 to discuss the possibility of an armed struggle. This 
meeting was an important step to persuade Makarios, who have some hesitations to 
initiate an armed struggle on the island.98  The founding document of the EOKA 
stated that the main purpose of the organization was to attract the attention of the 
international politics and to force the UN or British government to accept Enosis.99  
For the reinforcement of the organization in terms of arms, there were three main 
shipments from Athens to Cyprus in 1954. The first two shipments were sent on 2 
March 1954 and on 2 August 1954, respectively. The last one was on 10 November 
1954. General Grivas also arrived on the island with this shipment. As soon as he 
arrived, he was engaged in the distribution of arms, and in training small groups for 
the upcoming armed struggle.100 Consequently, the armed struggle of the EOKA was 
initiated on 1 April 1955, and at the same day, the leaflets were also distributed 
throughout the island to announce the aims of EOKA.  In the leaflets, it was specified 
that EOKA initiated its armed struggle to end the British ascendancy in Cyprus.101 
Later on, the EOKA had intensified its attacks. For example, on 21 June 1955, in the 
                                                
97 National Organization of Cypriot Fighters 
98 Xydis, p. 5.  
99 ibid, p. 7. 
100 ibid, pp. 10-15. 
101 Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict Indentity and Statehood, (Wakefield, 1976), p. 31.   
 31 
Turkish part of Nicosia 14 Turkish Cypriots were killed.102 EOKA killed 196 people 
in the island until November 1956.103 EOKA’s armed struggle was terminated by 
General Grivas when Zurich and London negotiations paved the way for the 
independence of Cyprus. 
The other important factor for the alteration of the British policy towards 
Cyprus was the threatening presence of the communists on the island. The presence 
of communism supposedly was also one of the factors for the British and Turkish 
governments not to be on the side of Enosis. Turks believed that, in the case of a 
communist rule, on the island, the Turkish Cypriots, whose majority had never 
become sympathetic to the communist system, would be deprived of their rights. 
Furthermore, the British and the Turkish governments suggested that if Enosis was 
exercised, it might resulted in the re-emergence of the civil war in Greece, since the 
Greek Prime Minister Papagos was going to eliminate the communists on the island.  
AKEL increased its significance in the political life of Cyprus during and 
after the Second World War.104 Of the leading members of AKEL were trained in 
Moscow. AKEL was the other legalized political party in the two-party system of 
Cyprus, besides the Nationalist Party. Although AKEL could not repeat its success in 
1946 municipal elections, it was still an important actor in the struggle of Enosis 
during the first of half of the 1950s. It supported Enosis movements, by staging 
strikes and provoking unrest in the island.105 Apart from these efforts, AKEL also 
tried to establish diplomatic contacts to win adherents in international arena. AKEL 
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sent its own delegation to some of the capitals of Europe and to Moscow to espouse 
Enosis.106    
 Actually, it was difficult to understand why AKEL supported the movement 
of Enosis in the first half of the 1950s, while any communist organizations had been 
banned in Greece because of civil war in the country between 1946 and 1949. If 
Enosis was performed, AKEL, as a communist party, would be automatically 
excluded from politics. The General Secretary of AKEL Ezekias Papaioannou 
dispelled the curiosity of people who were trying to understand AKEL’s purpose by 
supporting Enosis. In one of his speeches, he said,   
The Struggle of the People of Cyprus for national rehabilitation must be 
viewed in relation to their struggle of the Greek people for peace and 
national independence, not separately. It is part and parcel of the same 
struggle. Governments come and go but the Greek people are always 
there. When the people in Greece and Cyprus have achieved their 
national freedom, they will then be able to decide for themselves the 
type of regime they wish to live under.107 
 
Papaioannou’s speech unequivocally exposed that the communists of the 
island had two main goals. Their short-term aim was to get rid of the British 
existence on the island by supporting Enosis, and their long- term goal was to initiate 
a regime change in Greece. From this perspective, Turkish and British suspicion 
regarding the presence of communism on the island was dramatically accurate. 
On the other hand, by 1955 and onwards, there was a shift in AKEL’s policy 
towards Enosis. The first reason for this policy change was the founding of EOKA. 
As it was mentioned, EOKA was presided over by General Grivas who was an anti-
communist. Despite the fact that both EOKA and AKEL separately engaged in 
efforts for the realization of Enosis, they had never been in good terms. Although 
their short-term aims were the same, i.e. The union of the island with Greece, 
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AKEL’s long-term purpose impeded the cooperation between AKEL and EOKA. To 
prove this antagonism, it is enough to specify that EOKA had never admitted even 
one communist as a member in the EOKA since its foundation. Moreover, it was also 
averred that the original name of EOKA was “National Liberation Front of Cyprus”. 
This name, however, was not admitted because of its redolence of communist led 
national liberation fronts. Therefore, EOKA was adopted as the title of the 
organization.108  Besides EOKA’s manner, AKEL’s Central Committee took a 
decision on 14 April 1955 to condemn the armed struggle initiated on 1 April 1955 
by EOKA.  Later, in 1957, EOKA labeled the communists as traitors and in 1958 it 
published a “black book” which was mainly about communists’ destructive efforts 
for the realization of Enosis.109 Second reason for the changing policy of AKEL was 
its banning by British administration in 1955. The justifications for this decision 
were that AKEL was promoting unrest and caused sedition within the island. The 
ban entailed the detention of 135 leading AKEL members, including the General 
Secretary Papaioannou. Moreover, any publications related to communism were also 
banned. The banning of AKEL led the losing of the legal status of the party and it 
had to maintain its struggle in underground. Unavoidably, AKEL also relatively lost 
its popularity among Cypriots. This stepped down the role of the party on the fate of 
the island.110 The banning law on AKEL had been abolished in 1959 and party 
relatively regained its popularity after the declaration of independence of Cyprus in 
1960.     
Consequently, due to the aforementioned factors stemming from the US 
pressures, EOKA’s armed struggle and the presence of communism on the island led 
to changes in the British policy towards Cyprus question. The British administration 
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decided to convene a conference with the participation of the United Kingdom, 
Turkey, Greece, as well as the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, with the aim of the 
discussion of the question. The conference was gathered on 29 August 1955. It is 
important to note that, with this conference, Turkey for the first time officially 
became a part of the Cyprus Question.111 Actually, before the conference, the Greek 
ambassador in London, Mostras, anticipated that, the British government was going 
to implicate the Turkish government to the process. According to him, the British 
government established good terms with Turkey. Thus, the Greek resentment, which 
might have been occured because of the Turkish inclusion to the question, would not 
be a problem for Britain.112 Moreover it was suggested that London appreciated 
Turkey’s participation very much, because by doing so, Turkey not only reduced 
Britain own responsibility which might stem from its withdrawal from the island, but 
also the British government was able to balance Athens’ diplomatic pressures for 
bilateral negotiations on the question.113  
Conference had lasted for 10 days and an agreement among participants could 
not be reached. The conference was dispersed due to the notorious “6 – 7 September 
events” in Turkey. These events were the result of provocation in which a bomb had 
been thrown by a Turkish agent to the maternity home of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 
Thessaloniki. Hereupon a huge mob in Istanbul and in Izmir destroyed the properties 
of Greek minorities to an enormous scale.114 Although the London Conference 
brought nothing in terms of solution to the problem, it exposed that the issue was to 
be resolved among five parties of the question; Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish 
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Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriots come to an understanding. This was also the 
exclusion of the UN from the question at least for that period. After the London 
Conference, British government submitted different plans, in terms of solving the 
problem, to the parties of the question. The titles of these plans were the Radcliffe 
Proposal, the Foot Plan and Macmillan Plan and they were presented in December 
1956, in December 1957 and in June 1958, respectively. Among these proposals, 
although Turkey accepted only the last one, Greece accepted none of them.115 These 
plans, therefore, contributed nothing for the solution of the problem.  
Turkey’s acceptance of the MacMillan plan was a foregone conclusion. On 
16 November 1956, Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, convoked Professor 
Nihat Erim to prepare a report on Cyprus Question. In his first meeting with Erim, 
the Prime Minister gave essential information about the understanding of the Turkish 
Foreign Policy on possible solutions of the Question. According to this, Turkey’s 
first preference was the preserving of status quo in the island. In other words, Turkey 
did not support the withdrawal of the British from the island. The second preference 
was that, if Britain decided to leave the island, the administration of the island should 
be given to Turkey. The third acceptable solution was the equal partition of the island 
between Greece and Turkey. Besides, these two countries should leave some 
territories for the usage of British Bases. The fourth solution was that if the self-
determination right would be applied on the island, the rights of the Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey should be strictly protected. The last and most undesirable solution by 
Turkey was that Britain’s cession of the island to Greece.116 Among these 
preferences only the third one seemed plausible. The first two plans likely were not 
going to be accepted by Greece and while Turkey would not confirm the last two 
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solutions. Therefore, the Macmillan Plan was the best one which was parallel with 
the third option and that is the reason why Turkey supported it. Moreover, Menderes 
explained the frame of partition policy in his speech at Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA). This policy was also supported by the leader of opposition party 
of the country at the time, İsmet İnönü.117  
Although the partition policy had been adopted by Turkish political parties, 
defending of this policy did not find support in the international community. The 
1950s witnessed the decolonization of many European states. In such a period, when 
many states declared their independence, supporting of partition policy was not 
supported by other countries. Understanding of the inapplicable of the partition 
policy, the efforts of parties were in the direction of giving independence to Cyprus. 
The first step in that direction was taken by Turkey. As a result of Turkey’s 
invitation, Turkey and Greece bilaterally discussed the future of the island. These 
meetings between these two states also paved the way for the organization of Zurich 
Conference.118 Zurich Conference was held between 5 and 11 February in 1959. The 
participants of this conference were Turkey and Greece. The Prime Minister of both 
countries came to an agreement on internal and international status of future’s 
independent Cyprus.119  
After Zurich Conference, other important step was taken in London on 19 
February 1959.  London Agreement, of which essence articles were determined in 
Zurich, was signed with a ceremony. Thus, Zurich and London Agreements formed 
the basis of the emergence of Cyprus as an independent state in international politics 
by 16 August 1960.  This independent status of Cyprus opened its borders to the 
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Eastern Bloc and gave an opportunity that bloc to make use of the question in its 
struggle with the Western Bloc. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS CYPRUS 1950’S 
 
 
 
3.1. Soviet Foreign Policy towards Third World from 1945 to 1970 
 
Comprehension of the Soviet attitude towards Cyprus question requires a brief 
evaluation of the general Soviet attitude towards the Third World countries from 1945 
to 1970.  This period was remarkable in the course of Soviet Foreign Policy. From 1945 
to 1953, under the strict rule of Stalin, the USSR did not give much attention to the 
Third World countries. After Stalin’s death, however, Soviet approach towards the 
Third World countries changed dramatically. While during the former period Soviet 
popularity almost nonexistent in these countries, the latter period witnessed a great deal 
of development of Soviet popularity among the Third World countries. 
The Second World War resulted in the weakening of British and French powers 
and the defeat of Japan. This gave rise to the revolutionary movements in the colonial 
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countries who sought to get rid of their masters.120 These revolutionary movements 
might have been important tools for the USSR in its struggle with the Western world. 
Stalin, however, preferred to ignore or to underestimate the potential role of the Third 
World countries for the struggle against the capitalist world. There were five major 
factors for this policy of indifference. 
First, in the early post-war years, Stalin was mainly engaged in the economic 
reconstruction of the USSR and consolidating the Soviet influence in its satellites at the 
Eastern Europe. and in others, like China and North Korea.121 The second, the USSR 
essentially abstained from nuclear superiority during the initial post-war years. 
Moreover Stalin did not want to pursue an active policy in the Third World because of 
their potential for being casus belli between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc.122 
The third factor was that, Stalin did not believe the idea that increasing the Soviet 
influence in the Third World countries would aggrandize the Soviet popularity in 
international politics.123 The fourth and the most important factor was that, the Soviet 
foreign policy was based on the so-called “two camps theory” which was paraphrased 
by Andrei Zhdanov’s, the Secretary of Central Committee. The theory was the whole 
picture of the idea that “he who is not with us, against us.”124 In other words, Stalin 
supposed that only communist states were the allies of the USSR, while others, 
regardless of their difference among each other, were regarded as non-communists, 
thus, enemies of the Soviet people.  The last factor, but not the least, was that the main 
aim of the Soviet domestic policy, the creation of the “New Soviet Man”, impeded the 
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interaction of the Soviet Union with the Third World countries. The “New Soviet Man.” 
could be described as “an ultra modern, supranational secular carrier of working class 
consciousness.”125  As in the logic of “two camps” theory, a “New Soviet Man” could 
be a friend only with another “New Soviet Man”. In the eyes of Stalin, except for the 
Soviet Man, every people have common characteristics regardless of their differences. 
All of them were enemies of the New Soviet Man and they were parts of conspiracies, 
produced by West, aiming at destroying the communist system in the Soviet Union.126 
Being predicated on the afore-mentioned factors, Soviet economic and military 
aid were not directed to the Third World countries because Stalin believed that such aid 
would not be helpful in strengthening socialism in the World. Instead they might have 
resulted in the emergence of counter revolutionary movements against the communist 
system.127 Stalin regarded the leaders of the Third World movements of decolonization, 
such as Gandhi and Nehru, as puppets of the capitalist system. Therefore he always 
avoided cooperating with those leaders.128 In this connection, for Stalin, economic and 
military aid to these people connoted the strengthening of anti-communist movements. 
Indeed, during Stalin’s tenure, the Soviet military and economic aid was only sent to the 
Eastern European satellites of the USSR, to North Korea and to communist China.129  
All these factors resulted in the absence of the Soviet influence in the Third 
World countries. In other words, the Soviet Union could not make use of the Third 
World countries during Stalin’s term to get an advantage over the Western world. After 
his death, Stalin was criticized by his successors, because of his policy towards the 
Third World countries. Critics generally claimed that Stalin could not see the potential 
                                                
125 Ted Hoff, “Moscow’s Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: identities, institutions and interests” in The 
Cambridge History of Russia Ed. Ronald Grigor Suny, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 663.  
126 ibid, p. 668.  
127 Hoffman, Fleron, p. 393,394. 
128 Hosmer, Wolfe, p.4.  
129 ibid. 
 41 
role of the “national bourgeoisie” in the Third World countries in the struggle of 
communism against the capitalist system. 130 
After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Foreign policy towards the Third 
World countries was reviewed and this was resulted in the shifting of Soviet’s attitude 
towards the Third World countries. In this connection, new Soviet Foreign policy strove 
to make use of the Third World countries in their struggle against “the imperialist 
West.”After all, the USSR followed more constructive policies towards these countries 
with the aim of relaxation in their mutual relations.  On the other hand at the Bandung 
Conference, in Indonesia, in 1955, most of the participants were newly independent 
countries, declared that they would be on the side of neither the Western blocs nor 
Soviet bloc; instead, they would be a new pillar in the international politics as a non-
aligned countries.131 Almost a year later, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Khrushchev approved the shifting in the Soviet 
foreign policy by saying that the Soviet Union would be on good terms with the non-
aligned countries as of now.132 It was obvious that the main aim of the Soviet foreign 
policy was to increase the Soviet influence in the Third World Countries or, at least, to 
keep these countries aloof from Western influence. Within the frame of this new 
understanding, by 1955, the Soviet Union began to make economic and military aid to 
these countries.133The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was, therefore, the official 
declaration of the new Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World countries. 
Khrushchev’s explanations at the Congress also gave more flexibility to the Soviet 
diplomacy and indicated that the Soviet Union was not going to follow the foreign 
policy  
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The first aim of the Soviet Union, by 1955 and onwards, in the Middle East was 
the total elimination of the British influence in the region. The second aim, in the case 
of the accomplishment of the first, was to prevent the entry of a third power into the 
Middle East.134 In order to realize these aims, the Soviet Union began to set up good 
terms with most of the countries in the region by 1955. Among these countries, the first 
military aid agreement was signed between the USSR and Egypt in 1955.  In this 
connection, the Soviet Union permitted the selling of Czech arms to Egypt.135 In early 
1956, Syria received military aid from the Soviet Union. In 1958, after the overthrowing 
of pro-West monarchy by a coup d’état led by General Abdul Kasım, the Soviet Union 
supported Iraq, militarily. 136 
On the other hand, it is important to mention that the economic aid to the Third 
World countries by the USSR were suspended between the years 1961 and 1963 owing 
to the economic problems within the Soviet Union. During this era, Soviet officials 
preferred to concentrate on the economic issues at the domestic level, instead of 
ongoing in providing economic aid to the Third World countries. The following year, 
however, witnessed the recommence of aid both to the countries above and also to new 
countries.137 One of these new countries was Turkey. The development of good terms 
between the Soviet Union and Turkey will be analyzed in the following chapter. Still, it 
will be suffice to say that Turkey had a significant difference from other countries 
which were getting Soviet economic and military aid. First of all, it has been a member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover Turkey had also been 
considered as one of the most devoted members of NATO and a loyal ally of the USA.  
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The main purposes of the post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy towards the Third 
World countries can be summerized under four headings. The first one was keeping the 
Third World countries aloof from Western bloc and preventing the establishment of 
foreign military bases in their territories. The second one was blocking the Western 
influence in their  economics. The third one was the promoting of the influence of local 
communist parties and pro-communist labor unions. (To this effect perform, Moscow 
recommended the local communist parties to cooperate with the stronger nationalist 
parties or groups when it needed be.)138 Finally, the last aim was to make agrarian 
reforms with the aim of increasing consciousness of proletariats.139   
When the situation of international politics in the early 1970s is reviewed, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether Soviets could achieve these objectives or not. But certainly, 
thanks to its progressive interests in the Third World, which was reflected as political, 
military and economic aids to these countries, the Soviet Union could get an opportunity 
to ascend its penetration in these countries, when compared to the pre-1955 years.  
According to a Foreign and Commonwealth Office report in 1970, the Somalian 
ambassador in Sudan commented that the Egyptians found themselves in a dilemma 
owing to the Soviet aid to this country because Egypt was becoming entirely dependent 
to the USSR in terms of military, politics, and economics.140  
One of the international issues in which the influence of the Soviet Union was to 
be felt was the Cyprus problem. Although the Soviet Union seemed to be relatively 
disinterested in the Cyprus problem throughout 1950s, its concern on the question 
should be examined with the beginning of 1960s. It is possible to come up with two 
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reasons for the emergence of the Soviet interest on the question. The first was the 
cession of the island by Britain and the declaration of independence of Cyprus with the 
signing of Zurich and London Agreements. The second reason was the rapprochement 
of the USSR and Turkey. Improving relations of Turkey with the USSR forced the latter 
also to get more interested in the question. Still, it is necessary to mention the Soviet 
attitude towards the Cyprus question throughout 1950s, briefly. 
 
 
3.2. Soviet Attitude toward Cyprus Question throughout 1950s 
 
As it was mentioned before, Soviet foreign policy until 1953 was based on “two 
camps” theory. According to Stalinist hardline , anyboy who was not a satellite or 
unconditional supporter of the Soviet position was regarded as the enemy of Soviet 
Union. Thus, Cyprus, as a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom, was also considered 
as an enemy. This understanding prevented the Soviet Union to be interested in the 
Cyprus question.  
The only possible link of the Soviet Union with Cyprus could be the Communist 
Party of Cyprus, AKEL. An AKEL delegation traveled to the USSR in 1950 with the 
aim of getting support for Enosis in the international arena from the Soviet Union. At 
that time, however, AKEL could not achieve its goal partly due to Soviet indifference to 
the Cyprus problem.141 On the other hand, receiving Soviet support was important for 
the Greek Cypriots. It is claimed that in October 1952, Makarios admitted that if the 
Soviet Union had supported them in their case for Enosis, they would not be displeased. 
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Makarios accepted that their main goal was to get rid of the British yoke and to do so 
any means were acceptable to him.142  
As it was mentioned, AKEL was the only link between Cyprus and the Soviet 
Union. Although the Soviet foreign policy was changing in a positive way towards the 
Third World countries after the death of Stalin, there was no change in the policy of the 
Soviet Union towards the island. The main factor for this was that the island was still 
under the rule of Britain. The second factor was the ban on AKEL by the British 
administration which was the sole connection of the Soviet Union with the island in 
1955. AKEL, after the ban, embarked on underground activities, but it lost some of 
whatever popular support it previously had. Consequently, the Soviet Union also gave 
up its support for AKEL. It is important to note that, at the beginning of 1950 although 
the Soviet Union it was indifferent to the Cyprus problem, by 1952, it supported Enosis 
movement of AKEL. After the changing of the logic in the Soviet foreign policy, Soviet 
officials encouraged the local communist parties to cooperate with nationalist powers 
who were engaged in an anti-colonial struggle efforts. In the case of EOKA, however, 
the situation was different. The brain team of EOKA was formed by the leading and 
fervent anti-communists like Grivas. As it was mentioned, EOKA, from the beginning, 
did not admit the communists into the organization. Therefore from Soviet perspectives, 
it was not easy to encourage AKEL to give a hand to EOKA. After the ban on AKEL, 
the Soviet Union gave up backing Enosis and this also resulted in changing the policy of 
the USSR towards Cyprus. Thus, the Soviet Union was in favor of “liberation” of the 
Cypriots from their “foreign oppress”, which was represented not only by Britain, but 
also by Greece and Turkey.143 Although the Soviet Union maintained to support AKEL 
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in the struggle of the independence from the “foreign masters”, both of them were 
ineffective during the years of  ban on AKEL, from 1955 to 1959.144  
It is important to specify that the Soviet charge d’affaires in Turkey, Voronin, 
make a scathing criticism to Turkish foreign policy because of  the latter’s manner 
towards the Cyprus question in 1955. He unequivocally claimed that Turkish foreign 
policy was errorneous as it followed the demands of the USA. He averred that Turkey 
should not have relied on the USA; instead, it should have been in concert with the 
USSR for the solution of Cyprus problem, for its own good. Interestingly, he explained 
that the USSR would make Cyprus its own base against NATO and Baghdad Pact. He 
claimed, therefore, Turkey should have cooperated with the USSR.145 Voronin’s 
explaination were completely conflicted with USSR’s ‘sincere’ demands for the 
liberation of Cypriots. While the Soviet Union  wished to find a peaceful solution to the 
problem, Voronin claimed that the island would be turned into a Soviet base in the near 
future. Actually, Voronin’s explanation should be evaluated together with 
Papaioannou’s speech, mentioned in the previous chapter. Both of their speeches 
indicated that communists in Cyprus and Moscow might have had a long-term target 
which was formed by two stages. At first stage, Enosis would be implemented and at 
the second stage efforts would be intensified for a regime change in Greece. If this 
change had been achieved, Greece might have be a part of the Warsaw Pact.   
The Soviet approach towards the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 was 
pessimistic. Agreements were regarded as ‘so-called agreements’ by the USSR, and it 
was argued that they entailed nothing in terms of the solution of the Cyprus problem. 
Instead, these agreements approved the establishment of the Greek, Turkish and British 
condominimum over the island, by neglecting the will of Cypriots. They argued that as 
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a result of these agreements, the island would turn into a military base of NATO.146 
Although the Soviets criticized these agreements, with the independence of Cyprus, the 
relations between the Cyprus Republic and the USSR were improved. These improving 
relations and their effects on the Cyprus problem will be examined in the following 
chapter. 
 
 
   
  
 
                                                
146 Cited in Adams, AKEL: Communist...., p.58. 
 48 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS CYPRUS DISPUTE  
FROM 1960 TO 1974 
 
 
 
4.1. Aftermath of Zurich and London Agreements 
 
Zurich and London Agreements included four main parts. These are the draft 
for a constitution for Cyprus Republic; a treaty of guarantee between Cyprus, Britain, 
Greece, and Turkey; a treaty of alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey; a 
treaty of establishment between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey; respectively. 
As the agreements had foreseen, Cyprus became an independent state by 16 August 
1960.  After the declaration of independence, election was immediately held in 
conformity with the related articles of the agreements. As a result of election, while 
 49 
Makarios was elected as the president of Cyprus and Fazil Kucuk became his vice.147 
However, mainly owing to the ethnic discrepancies between the two main 
communities of the island, the full implementation of the agreements could not be 
performed.   
Under the stimulus of the Helen nationalism, Greek Cypriots considered 
themselves simply as a part of the greater Greek nation. Nevertheless, the Zurich and 
London Agreements forced them to live side by side with the Turkish Cypriots. 
AKEL, for instance, criticized Makarios in March 1959 for giving approval to the 
Agreements. AKEL argued that these agreements made Enosis impossible. It was 
also opposed to the recognition of military intervention right to Britain, Turkey, and 
Greece to island within the frame of treaty of guarantee. Makarios who signed the 
Agreements on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, ironically, stated that the Agreements 
had just created a state but not a nation.148 He avowed that he signed the Agreements 
due to pressure of the NATO, and he had never given up his ultimate goal, Enosis.149 
On the other hand, one of leading actors of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş, 
retrospectively alleged that Makarios was engaged in destruction of Turkish 
Cypriot’s equal political rights, stemmed from the Agreements. Furthermore, he 
accused Makarios for making preparation for an armed struggle to realize his goal.150 
Denktaş also did not believe the idea that Cyprus Republic would survive. Therefore, 
he suggested that the Turkish Cypriots should adopt the idea of partition of the island 
(taksim).151 It was claimed that Makarios did not intend to admit the Turkish 
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Cypriots as the co-founder of the Republic since he insisted on that they are the 
minority of the island.152  
The Zurich and London Agreements liberated Greek Cypriots from their 
master and, for the first time, they became the main rulers of the island. Greek 
Cypriots wanted to make use of this position to realize Enosis. However, the 
Agreements had put Enosis out of the way. They, therefore, had to be abolished and 
a new regulation must be put into force in favor of Greek Cypriots. “ The Akritas 
Plan” was tailored to fulfill of this requirement. This plan was formed by Makarios, 
the minister of interior, Yorgacis, and the Chairman of the House of Representatives 
of the island, Klerides. In accordance with this plan, the opposition of the Turkish 
Cypriots for Enosis would be removed or they would be turned into ineffective 
subject of the island.153 With the aim of falling the effects of the Turkish Cypriots on 
the island Makarios visited Turkey in November 1962. He complained to Turkish 
officials about the system of the Agreements. He argued that the system was not 
suitable to put necessary laws for “ the common good” into force. He, therefore, 
suggested that a package of constitutional amendments was necessary to dispel the 
blocking of the system. The Prime Minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, rejected 
Makarios’ offer and the latter returned to the island empty handed.154 In spite of 
being rejected, Makarios insisted on the constitutional amendments, he believed, 
were essential for the maintenance of the state system effectively. Indeed the 
complications of the system reflected to the communities of the island from the 
beginning of 1963. On 30 January 1963, during the parliamentary debates of the 
House of Commons, a member of parliament, Mr. Bottomley, asked the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, about the situation of British 
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troops in the island. In response, Mr. Sandys admitted that the tension between the 
communities in Cyprus had been growing and he was afraid that this might be 
resulted in the resurrection of the past unrest on the island.155  In fact, these 
constitutional amendments would eliminate whatever political power the Turkish 
Cypriots had and would turn them into a mere minority rather co-founders of the 
Republic. This was why Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots were strictly opposed to 
these amendments. When Makarios gave a memorandum to Ankara, Athens and the 
Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazıl Küçük, about these amendments on 30 November 
1963, not surprisingly the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots rejected 
them. The Turkish government declared to Makarios on 16 December 1963 that it 
was not in favor of constitutional agreements. This refusal of the offer caused the 
acceleration of the tension between two communities and a chain of violent events 
took place by 22 December 1963. These events confirmed the inapplicable of the 
Zurich and London Agreements and paved way for the outbreak of the 1964 Crisis. 
 
 
 
4.2. 1964 Crisis and its Aftermath 
  
The series of events which would create 1964 crisis were initiated in the night 
of 21-22 December 1963. At first, three Turkish Cypriots were killed in Nicosia. 
Upon this, the Turkish Cypriots gathered in the centre of Nicosia and protested the 
murders. By the time, Makarios unilaterally declared that the Treaty of Guarantee 
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would be no longer in force.156 By doing this, Makarios probably wanted to impede a 
possible military intervention by Turkish troops. A day later, the leaders of the two 
communities, Makarios and Küçük, gave out a notice to stop fighting between the 
two communities of the island. However, on 24 December 1963 clashes continued 
and barricades were constructed between the Turkish and Greek villages.157 Upon the 
maintenance of the clashes, the Turkish government decided to enforce its 
conventionary right stemming from the Treaty of Guarantee and three Turkish jets 
hedgehopped over the island to warn the Cypriots. This event alerted the big powers 
whether Turkey would enlarge its military intervention or not.158 By the way, 
Makarios complained of the Turkish government to the UN because of its meddling 
in the internal affairs of the island and its violation of the airspace of Cyprus. 
The Soviet Union was clearly against to a possible Turkish invasion of the 
island. The Soviet ambassador in Cyprus, Pavel Zermoshin, visited Makarios on 1 
January 1964. Zermoshin ensured Makarios that latter’s complaint would be 
espoused by the Soviet representative in the UN Security Council.159  
When the Turkish government halted its military intervention, the resurrection of 
Cyprus Republic became almost impossible. The leaders of the Turkish Cypriots 
believed that the government of Cyprus lost its legitimacy and the island should be 
partitioned between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. By January 1964, all 
Turkish officials in the Cyprus government resigned and the Turkish Cypriots, living 
in the south part of the island, moved to the north side. On the other hand, Rauf 
Denktaş explained that the Turkish Cypriots did not deliberately resign from their 
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offices. He claimed that the Greek Cypriots forced the Turkish Cypriots to leave their 
offices.160 Whatever the reason for the resignation of the Turkish Cypriots, Cyprus 
government was entirely obtained in the hands of Greek Cypriots. In other words, 
this was the de facto partition of the island.161  Upon these events, a fivefold 
conference was gathered in London on 16 January 1964 with the participation of 
London, Ankara, Athens, and the leaders of the Cypriot communities, Makarios and 
Küçük.162 However, the conference brought nothing for the solution of the problem 
and it was dissolved on 21 January 1964. The dissolution of the conference 
confirmed the accuracy of Küçük’s explanation “ The Cyprus Republic is dead”163 
After the dissolution of the London Conference, Makarios engaged himself to 
strengthen the Greek Cypriots Army against to a possible Turkish intervention. With 
this purpose, the Minister of Interior of Cyprus, Yorgacis, met with the Soviet 
ambassador, Zermoshin on 30 January 1964. They mainly negotiated on Cyprus 
dispute. It was alleged that, at the meeting, the Minister asked for Soviet military aid 
to Cyprus for the equipment of army and police forces.164 Thus, Makarios’ first 
contact with the Soviet Union after the independence of Cyprus was established. By 
the way, the USA, London, Greece and Turkey were negotiating to bring tranquility 
to the island. To do so, the sending of a NATO Peace Keeping Force was envisaged. 
The Soviet Union was strictly against this idea. To express his annoyance, 
Khrushchev sent a massage to Ankara and London. In his massage to Ankara, he 
specified that the meaning of sending of NATO Peace Keeping Force to the island 
was tantamount to the invasion of the island by NATO powers. It would be an overt 
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violation of the territorial integrity and independence of the island. He underlined 
that the Soviet Union would not keep silent in the case of launching NATO troops to 
Cyprus.165 Khrushchev sent a longer massage to the British government and it was 
discussed in the House of Commons on 13 February 1964. In the massage 
Khrushchev accused of Turkey, Britain and the USA to agitate the Turkish Cypriots 
against Cyprus government. He claimed that the NATO powers were the primarily 
responsible for the existence disorder on the island and he blamed NATO for making 
use of this unrest as an excuse to meddle the internal affair of the island and to turn it 
into a NATO base. He uttered that both Turkish and Greek Cypriots were capable of 
solving their internal problems themselves; they did not need any foreign 
intervention to solve their problems. Khrushchev advised that the NATO powers had 
to leave the island to its owners. He noted that the Cyprus problem could not be 
solved beyond the will of Cypriots. He also declared that the Soviet Union could not 
be indifferent to the Cyprus dispute not only because of its responsibility for 
protection of international peace, but also its geographical proximity to the island. 
Khrushchev, therefore, insisted that the Soviet government would not permit the 
dispatch of NATO powers to the island and his government condemned any kind of 
actions to do this. Instead of the NATO powers, Khrushchev suggested that an 
international intervention to be exercised at the level of the UN and a UN peace 
keeping force should be sent to the island for the assurance of tranquility.166  As a 
matter of fact the Soviet Union overtly ensured that it would prop Makarios, if he 
applied to the UN for the transfer of Cyprus dispute to the Security Council. In fact, 
Makarios initiated preparation to arrange a letter of memorandum to the UN on 12 
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February 1964.167 Two days later, the Soviet Union gave a guaranty to Makarios 
essentially on two matters. First, the Soviet Union would not allow the landing of 
Turkish troops on the island. Second, it would defend and espouse Makarios’ thesis 
in the Security Council.168 In fact, in the discussion of the Security Council, the 
Soviet representative, Nikolai Fedorenko, argued that the 1964 Crisis was caused by 
the illegal Turkish military intervention stemming from ‘the so-called Agreements’ 
of 1959. He criticized the NATO members for their efforts to turn the island into a 
NATO base. He finally added that the Soviet Union felt attracted to Makarios and his 
government who ‘heroically defended’ the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus 
Republic.169 At the end of the deliberations in the Security Council the launching of 
the United Nations Peace Keeping Forces for Cyprus (UNPFCYP) was accepted and 
it embarked on its duty on 5 March 1964. 
It was obvious that the NATO powers were in favor of launching a NATO 
Peace Keeping Force to the island. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations of the United Kingdom, Duncan Sandys, in his statement on Cyprus 
dispute in the House of Commons on 17 February 1964, declared that the 
governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey were in favor of landing NATO troops 
on the island, particularly on two grounds. First NATO forces had a chance to arrive 
the island immediately. Second, the termination of inter-communal conflict in the 
island was essential for the interests of NATO members.170 However, NATO 
members were not able to impose their plan on Makarios, especially because he was 
backed by the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the Soviet aid to Makarios was 
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maintained in the course of the 1964 crisis. With the aim of initiating the flights 
between Soviet Union and Cyprus, the negotiations of the Soviet and Cypriot 
officials started by on 25 February 1964. It was also claimed by the Turkish press, 
these flights facilitated the sending of Soviet military personal and equipments to the 
island.171 A day later, it was declared that a treaty of arms trade between the Soviet 
Union and Cyprus was also signed.172 As a matter of fact, on 9 March 1964, it was 
reported that Greek Cypriots attacked to the Turkish Cypriots with Soviet weapons, 
which was discovered after capturing of two Soviet-made shells used by the Greeks 
against the Turks in Paphos.173       
To be sure, the main factor, which led Makarios to collaborate with Soviet 
Union, was to balance the pressure of NATO powers on him. It is hard to assume 
that Makarios ever wanted to make the island Moscow’s puppet. Makarios’ main 
purpose was to impede the landing of Turkish or NATO troops on the island. He was 
convinced that if he allowed the landing of these forces, the island would be turned 
into a NATO base and thus would lost its independence. Of course, the Soviet Union 
was staunchly against the “NATOisation” of the island. Its objective was to turn 
Cyprus into one of the non-aligned countries which had good terms with the Soviet 
Union. Thanks to the Soviet support, Makarios achieved to keep the UN in and 
NATO out.174  
The Soviet Union also could make the propaganda of its interests in the island 
with the help of AKEL. Indeed, the main international determinant of AKEL’s 
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foreign policy was Moscow. In other words, the party’s main goal was to satisfy 
Moscow’s demands and to follow a Moscow oriented foreign policy. AKEL had 
never deviated from the Soviet perceptions on Cyprus problem, except in 1965, when 
the Soviet officials declared that a federal system in the island could be also 
conceivable as a solution of the Cyprus dispute.175 As a result of this witting 
opposition of AKEL to federal system, the Soviet Union omitted Cyprus in its slogan 
of the anniversary of October Revolution in 1966.176 This was a severe reprimand for 
AKEL, and the officials of the party came to understand that they had no chance of 
conflicting with Moscow.177 It has been alleged that this rigid dependency of AKEL 
to Moscow stemmed from its being financed by the latter. Although this financial aid 
had been denied by the General Secretary of the Party, Papaioannou, for the 
maintenance of the capital flow, AKEL had to be in conformity with Moscow’s line 
on Cyprus dispute. In fact, the party became a fierce advocate of Soviet policy on 
Cyprus. The party’s propaganda was mainly committed to the expulsion of British 
bases from the island and to the prevention of NATO’s infringement to the island.178  
The rising Soviet influence on the island alarmed the USA and other anti-
communist circles. Thus, General Grivas accused Makarios of being responsible 
from the growing of communism in Cyprus in January 1964.179 Furthermore, General 
Grivas returned to the island in June 1964. When a journalist asked a question to 
İnönü, during his visit to Washington, about Grivas’ arrival in the island the Prime 
Minister responded that it was too early to comment on this. It was obvious that 
Inonu avoided giving a definite statement on Grivas’ arrival. However, the arrival of 
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Grivas was known by the USA and the Americans told İnönü that, Grivas had arrived 
in the island to fight against with communism on the island.180 Within the framework 
of the Geneva Conference181 the USA proposed a plan, namely, the Acheson Plan.182 
The plan was presented to participants twice. At first, the plan was rejected by all 
parties. Then, a modified plan was presented. Although the Turkish government 
seemed to accept this plan, especially due to Makarios’ insistence Athens refused it. 
Being conscious of the advantages stemming from being a president of an 
independent country, Makarios had a tendency for keeping the independent status of 
the island rather than supporting Enosis.183 This would also lead to a disagreement 
among the Greek Cypriots in the following years, who would be divided as the “pro-
Enosis” and “pro-independence” factions. The second factor for Makarios’ refusal of 
the plan was the Soviet support for him. This encouraged Makarios to pursue a pro-
independence policy against to NATO powers. In fact the Turkish daily, Cumhuriyet, 
exposed the articles of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Cyprus on 21 
October 1964. Although the exact signing date of the agreement was untold, in 
accordance with the agreement, Makarios ensured to prevent the landing of NATO 
troops on the island and to be persistent on the independence of the island in return 
for Soviet support to Cyprus. The articles of the agreement would also be kept secret 
from the NATO countries.184 In fact after the dissolution of Geneva conference, in 
September 1964, Makarios made an agreement with Soviet Union to buy anti-aircraft 
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missiles. In the 1964 crisis Makarios was convinced that in the case of a Turkish air 
attack to the island, Greece would not be able to assist Greek Cypriots. This 
conviction of Makarios led him to sign the arms trade agreement with Soviet 
Union.185 Actually, the Acheson plan was prepared to prevent the growing danger of 
communism and to hinder the penetration of the Soviets to the island.186 In other 
words, it required the indirect inspection of the island by the NATO powers. In the 
case of the acceptance of the plan, it would hinder a possible splitting of NATO’s 
southern flank. As a matter of fact, this was the primary factor for the USA to be 
engaged in Cyprus dispute. This can be also understood from a conversation between 
a US diplomat and Denktaş. She informed Denktaş that the main factor for the US 
government for engaging itself to Cyprus dispute was the existence of the possibility 
for the cracking of NATO’s southern flank. She added that if there were no such a 
danger, the USA would not be interested in the clashes of the two communities with 
each other in the island.187   
In the process of the 1964 crisis the Soviet policy towards Cyprus was based 
on two objectives. One of these purposes was, through backing Makarios, the 
keeping the island away from being a NATO base. By the end of 1964, the Soviet 
Union was seemed successful in realizing its first objective. The second objective 
was, by making use of Greek and Turkish annoyance towards NATO, to develop 
good terms with these states.188  Owing to coup d’état in Greece by a junta in 1967, 
the Soviet Union could not be successful to develop good terms with this country. 
However, this was not the case for Turkey.  
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Throughout the 1964 crisis, the policy of the USA was not in conformity with 
the Turkish policy towards the island. Although the UNPFCYP landed to the island 
on 5 March 1964, it was not so effective in halting the clashes between the two 
communities and the clashes continued until the summer of 1964. Thereupon, the 
Turkish government, once again, decided to undertake a military intervention on the 
island. However, this time the Turkish government faced up to American opposition. 
The Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü had received the ‘infamous’ letter of 
President Lyndon Johnson. In the letter, the US declared that it would not permit the 
use of NATO arms in any military intervention to Cyprus. Furthermore, the US 
covertly threaten the Turkish government by saying that it would not assist Turkey in 
case of a Soviet attack to this country during a clash in Cyprus.189 This massage 
forced the Turkish government to suspend its decision for military intervention on 
the island. On the other hand, when made public, Johnson’s letter unavoidably 
created a strong negative public opinion towards the USA, for the first time in the 
history of Turkish-American relations.190 Thus, the Cyprus question indirectly 
impelled the Turkish officials to diversify their alternatives in their country’s foreign 
policy.191 However, it seemed difficult for the Turks to accomplish this since there 
was no opportunity for Turks to break the ice with the Soviet Union. During the 
summer of 1964, clashes among Cypriots continued and consequently, the Turkish 
government, once again, decided to send sorties over the island on 9 August 1964. 
The following day, the island was bombarded by the Turkish aircrafts. This action 
annoyed Khrushchev. After the bombardment, he sent a massage to İnönü and 
warned the Turkish government to halt operations immediately. Khrushchev argued 
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that no state had right to intervene in the internal affairs of another state. On 10 
August 1964, Turkey terminated its air strikes after Makarios halted Greek Cypriots’ 
harassment of the Turkish Cypriots.192 However, the failure of the Geneva 
Conference in August 1964 indicated that it would not be possible to find a solution 
for the Cyprus dispute within the framework of NATO. Makarios’ persistence 
wearied the NATO powers and a solution to the problem was left to the initiative of 
the UN. This atmosphere provided an opportunity for the Turkish government to 
diversify its foreign policy. In the mean time, the Soviet Union also wanted to 
develop its relations with Turkey. The intersecting interests of these two states began 
a new phase in their relations.  
This new phase began with the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun 
Cemal Erkin, to Moscow on 31 October 1964.  This was followed by a visit of a Soviet 
delegation to Ankara on 4 January 1965. The chief of the delegation, Podgorny, 
explained that on the Cyprus question, the Soviet Union conceived a federal system as 
one of the formulas for ending the Cyprus dispute.193  As already mentioned, this 
alteration in the Soviet policy on Cyprus disturbed the Communist Party of Cyprus, 
AKEL. On the other hand, Soviet support for a federal solution was not certified by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom. According to a FCO 
document Podgorny stated in his address to both houses of Turkish Parliament that, 
Podgorny said that the Soviet Union supported a solution on the basis of the protection 
of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the island with the assurance of the rights 
of both communities on the island. The FCO admitted that Podgorny never implied a 
federal solution, at least according to the press reports. However, FCO document 
admitted that it was not clear whether Podgrorny implied a federal solution in his other 
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speeches not reported by the press.194 Podgorny’s visit was followed by that of the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, on 17 May 1965. At that time, the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, also went to Moscow on 9 August 1965. This senior-level 
visit witnessed the signing of cultural cooperation agreements and the decision to 
accelerate economic cooperation between the two countries.195 Within the framework of 
economic cooperation, the Soviet Union loaned 168 million dollars to Turkey and 
provided an additional 15 million dollars to finance the construction of the Arpaçayı 
dam. During Ürgüplü’s visit, there were also negotiations between the two countries for 
the establishment of a steel mill, a tractor factory, and an oil refinery.196 Relations 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union improved in the following years. For the first 
time a Soviet Prime Minister, Kosygin, visited Turkey on 20 December 1966 and this 
was followed by the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, on 19 
September 1967.197 In 1967 a Soviet–Turkish inter-governmental economic agreement 
was signed as well. This agreement accelerated the degree of cooperation between the 
two countries. In an interview published in Izvestiia on 4 January 1972, Semion 
Skachkov, then the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for 
Foreign Economic Relations, confirmed that since 1967 there had been extensive 
economic and technological cooperation between the two countries. In the same 
interview he added that in return for Soviet economic aid to Turkey, the latter provided 
some required goods such as cotton, tobacco, bauxites, and citrus fruit.198 The FCO also 
reported that, “Russia pledged to Turkey in aid 366 million dollars since 1967.”199  On 
15 March 1972, a supplemental agreement to the 1967 economic agreement was signed 
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in Ankara by Foreign Trade Secretary General, Şeref Durugönül and Soviet Foreign 
Trade Ministry Departmental Director, Kuznetsov, which allowed a 80 million dollars 
credit to Turkey.200 These developing relations would require the Soviet government to 
pursue a different policy towards Cyprus in the 1967 crisis than that of  1964. 
 The 1964 crisis had many consequences. First, it impelled the Soviet goverment 
to be engaged in the Cyprus dispute. For the first time the Soviet government and 
Makarios established diplomatic relations. While the former’s purposes were the 
protection of the island from NATO penetration and a manipulating the threat of a 
possible split in NATO’s southern flank, the Soviet aimed at counterbalancing the  
NATO pressure and maintaining the independent status of the island. A second 
consequence was the deterioration of relations between Turkey and the USA. This 
created an opportunity for the Soviet Union and Turkey to reinvigorate their relations 
which had been frozen since the end of the World War II. The third and most 
remarkable result of the 1964 Crisis was the de facto partition of the island. As it was 
mentioned above, the Turkish officials resigned from their offices and the Turkish 
Cypriots began to gather in the north side of the island living in the pockets of 
somewhat fortified enclaves. On the other hand, Denktaş stated that the Turkish 
Cypriots did not deliberately resign from their office. He claimed that, the Greek 
Cypriots forced another to resign.201 Whatever the reason for the resignation of the 
Turkish Cypriots, the government of Cyprus fell entirely into the hands of the Greek 
Cypriots. Indeed, in their enclaves the Turkish Cypriots established the institutions 
which were basic requirements of their own state. However, the Greek Cypriots did not 
recognize this formation. Moreover, Ankara did not ask any state to recognize the 
Turkish side as a state, simply because the Turkish government knew that such an offer 
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would be refused by others. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot government was 
recognized as the ‘official’ government of Cyprus.202 Therefore, this de facto partition 
was not in favor of the Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately, this partition made the Cyprus 
problem more indissoluble and might have prevented the possible reconciliation of two 
communities with each other.  Clashes sporadically continued between these official 
and unofficial states on the island. These clashes paved the way for the outbreak of the 
1967 crisis on the island.203           
 
 
4.3. 1967 Crisis and its Aftermath 
 
The sporadic clashes endangered the order in Cyprus until April 1967.  On 8 
April 1967, Greek Cypriots attacked a Turkish village, named Mari, and eleven 
Turkish Cypriots were wounded. The expansion of this clash was impeded by the 
UNPFCYP.204 By this time, the Greek government was abolished by a military coup 
and a military junta came to power on 21 April 1967. The new Greek government 
was staunchly pro-Enosis and they believed that Enosis should be realized as soon as 
possible. With the coming of the junta into power in Greece, the fighting on the 
island intensified. To support the Enosis movement, the Greek government began to 
send its military forces to the island. On 13 November 1967 Rauf Denktaş protested 
the landing of Greek soldiers on the island and claimed that Greek government was 
attempting Enosis in terms of military. Upon this, he suggested that, the Turks should 
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determine a new Cyprus policy in favor of the partition of the island.205 Two days 
later, the pro-Enosis Greek Cypriots under the command of General Grivas invaded 
two Turkish villages, namely Boğaziçi and Geçitkale.206 This was the beginning of 
the 1967 Crisis. The invasion of these villages resulted in the death of 29 Turkish 
Cypriots. This was clearly a breach of the constitution and the Turkish government 
decided to exercise a military intervention to the island. This decision deterred 
Grivas’ forces and they withdrew from Boğaziçi and Geçitkale.207 
The United States opposed a military intervention fearing that it would turn 
into a war between Greece and Turkey. This might have resulted in splitting the 
southern flank of NATO. In order to eliminate this possibility, the USA nominated 
Cyrus Vance as a special mediator. As a result of his shuttle diplomacy between 
Ankara, Athens and Nicosia, he managed to prevent the outbreak of a war between 
Greece and Turkey. The 1967 crisis ended with the acceptance of the Turkish 
demands by the Greek government. According to an agreement between Ankara and 
Athens, Greek soldiers were withdrawn from the island. The Commander-in-Chief of 
the Greek Cypriots, General Grivas should also leave the island.208 Interestingly, 
Washington’s reaction to the Turkish intention for a military intervention was not as 
fierce as during the 1964 crisis. This might have been the result of the discontent 
among Turks towards the US after 1964 and Turkey’s developing relations with 
Soviet Union especially after the October 1964. Besides these factors, there were 
others for the US government to follow a modest policy towards Turkey in 1967. The 
first factor was Makarios’ rejection of the Acheson Plan, which anticipated the 
landing of NATO troops on the island with the aim of impeding the growth of 
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communist movements. The second was Makarios’ split with the Greek junta 
because of their different opinions on Enosis policy. The third was the increasing 
cooperation between Cyprus and the Soviet Union.  
On the other hand, although Soviet officials criticized Ankara for its decision 
for military intervention, saying that the parties of the Cyprus dispute should have 
avoided any actions that might have been resulted in the acceleration of tension on 
the island, the Soviet Union sat on the fence during the 1967 Crisis.209 The first 
factor for this even-handed Soviet policy was that the Greek Cypriots attacks, which 
impelled the Turks to take a decision for the exercise of a military intervention, were 
planned and commanded by the military government in Athens. The second factor 
was the developing relations between Turkey and Soviet Union after October 1964 
and these proceeding relations deterred the latter from opposing Turkish military 
intervention strongly. 
The end of the 1967 crisis in favor of Turkish government engendered the 
emergence of two different opinions on reaching Enosis among Greek Cypriots. The 
first was that the Greek Cypriots should overrule the Turkish Cypriot resistance by a 
sudden military attack. Overcoming the Turkish resistance would facilitate the 
declaration of Enosis. On the other hand, the second opinion anticipated that the 
Turkish Cypriot resistance could only be overcome by a long-term strategy. 
According to this long-term plan, Turkish Cypriots should be subjected to economic 
and political pressures. This strategy of deterrence would provide the opportunity for 
the declaration of Enosis. While the ex-EOKA members advocated the former, 
President Makarios was in favor of the latter. Moreover, because of this 
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disagreement, there were rumors of the overthrow of Makarios from presidency by a 
military coup supported by the junta, although the Greek foreign minister denied 
them.210 
Makarios believed that a sudden Greek military attack by the Greeks would 
have to confront a Turkish military intervention as in the 1967 crisis. He argued that 
for the time being, Greeks were not capable of coping with a possible Turkish 
military attack.211 Moreover, he advocated that more states in the UN should support 
Greek Cypriots’ struggle for Enosis. This was the primary motive for Makarios’ 
foreign policy of Cyprus. His foreign policy, especially since 1967, had been based 
on being a non-aligned country and having friendly relations with the Soviet Union. 
Following this policy would entail a secure position for Cyprus among the non-
aligned countries and in the UN. In addition, after 1967 Makarios, supposedly, gave 
up the policy of Enosis. Indeed, in 1971 he admitted that, although Enosis was his 
superior purpose, it was not feasible in the existent conditions of international 
politics.212 He believed that as long as the threat of Turkish military intervention was 
in force, it would not be possible to put Enosis into the practice. 
Makarios was criticized by the Greek junta for his ambition for being 
president of an independent country. The main factor for Makarios’ persistence on 
presidency was that he was becoming aware of the advantages stemming from the 
presidency. Moreover, the Communist Party of Cyprus, AKEL, and the trade unions 
under the direct control of the party were opposed to Enosis since 1967. Furthermore, 
trade was dramatically in the hands of Greek Cypriots on the island. The capital 
                                                
210 House of Commons, Parlamentary Debates (Oral Answers) Vol. 751 (London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, 1967), p. 964. 
211 Somuncuoğlu, p. 78. 
212 TNA: FCO, 9-1366, p. 20. 
 68 
circulation of the market was in favor of them. The expenditures of the UNPFCYP 
and Turkey’s economic aid to the Turkish Cypriots were transferred to the Greek 
Cypriots’ cash. In other words, there were vital economic benefits to be derived from 
the independence for island’s artisan class. All these factors forced Makarios to 
pursue an independent policy against the Greek government. This brought about the 
deterioration in relations between Greek government and Cyprus dramatically.213 
These deteriorating relations induced Makarios to improve relations with the Soviet 
Union. Thus he could not only balance Athens pressure, but also provide a wide 
scope for his foreign policy.214  
Makarios’ foreign policy of Cyprus also improved the relations of Cyprus 
with the rest of the communist world. On 11 January 1968, the Cypriot Council of 
Ministers decided to make an airline agreement with Czechoslovakia and flights 
between two countries were initiated on 2 April 1968.215 On February 2, trade unions 
in Czechoslovakia labeled the Turkish threats for the invasion of Cyprus as a NATO 
conspiracy.216 15 March 1968 witnessed the signing of trade agreements between 
Cyprus and East Germany. At the end of the same month, the Soviet Union and 
Cyprus signed a five-year trade and payment agreement. This agreement required the 
exchange of goods valued at more than 12 million pounds. The improving relations 
with communist world was also reflected in the cultural sphere. The Soviet 
ambassador, Tolubeyev, promulgated that two hundred Cypriots came to the USSR 
to study at various universities.217 Cyprus also hosted to international communist 
formations. About 50 members of the World Peace Council (WPC) gathered in 
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Nicosia on 5 June 1968, including the USA, the USSR, France, Canada and India. 
Three days later, the WPC Council issued a memorandum on the Cyprus question 
and declared that the Council was in favor of protecting the independent status of the 
island and was opposed to any initiatives to bring the island under NATO control.218 
Developing relations with communist world provided military equipments to Cyprus. 
Although the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Smirnov, denied this 219 on 27 June 
1968, the Turkish press revealed that the Soviet Union had sent arms to Cyprus out 
of Egypt since 1964.220  
By the beginning of 1971 the Soviet Union increased its overt support to 
Makarios against the NATO powers. According to an article published in Pravda on 
16 February 1971, the Soviet Union criticized Britain for opening of its bases at 
Akrotiri to the USA. The article claimed that the US would use these bases to 
provide the delivering of its aircrafts to Jordan out of Cyprus. According to the 
Soviet officials, this confirmed the intention of the USA to make use of Cyprus as its 
station in the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, military bases had also been used 
for the transferring of Phantoms to Israel.  The Soviet Union once again stated that it 
would always be opposed the island becoming a NATO base. On the other hand, 
President Makarios stated that the turning of Cyprus into a NATO base would not be 
beneficial for its national interests. He also added that the Cyprus’ entrance to NATO 
was unthinkable. In addition to Makarios, the communist Party, AKEL, also believed 
that Cyprus had to remove any foreign bases on its territory. 
The Soviet Union accused the USA of trying to induce the communities of 
the island against each other. The Soviet Union believed that NATO supported the 
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underground activities in Cyprus for a military coup against Makarios. The Soviet 
Union implied it would back Makarios against a military coup by saying that the 
USSR was in favor of a non-aligned Cyprus and saw this requirement as a necessity 
for the stabilization of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. 221 In an 
article, published in Pravda on 2 July 1971, Nikolai Bragin claimed that the Greek 
junta aimed at overcoming Makarios’ government and in collaboration with the 
EOKA–B to accomplish this.222  
In July 1971, Makarios paid a visit to Moscow. In his assessment of the visit, 
he stated that the Soviet Union supported an independent Cyprus. However, he was 
anxious about the developing relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union after 
1965. Makarios thought that the relations of Cyprus might have been secondary for 
the USSR to its relations with Turkey. Therefore, he was concerned that the Soviet 
Union entertained a federal solution for Cyprus.223 However, this was not the reality. 
Indeed, by 1971 the essential Soviet objectives regarding the Cyprus question could 
be grouped under four main headings. First, the Soviet Union aimed at impeding the 
NATO presence on Cyprus. Parallel with the first, the second goal was the protection 
of the independence of the island. To do so, the Soviet Union in practice backed 
President Makarios. The third Soviet aim was to avoid annoying Ankara to maintain 
good relations with Turkey. Last but not least, the Soviet Union pursued any 
opportunities to divide NATO’s southern flank so as to obtain an advantage in its 
struggle against the ‘Imperialist Western World”. All these aims exposed that the 
Soviet attitude towards Turkey and Cyprus had to be balanced. Because, on the one 
hand, extreme support to Cyprus might have led to Turkey’s anger, on the other, 
proceeding relations between Turkey and Soviet Union might have increased 
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Makarios’ anxiety. The latter possibility might have resulted in an alteration of 
Makarios’ policy towards NATO and such a change would not be in favor of Soviet 
goals on Cyprus. In other words, Makarios might have permitted the NATO 
countries to intervene in the internal affairs of the island. Nevertheless, the 
prevention of landing NATO troops on the island was the most vital Soviet interest. 
Indeed, the British officials, supposedly, claimed that if the Soviet Union had to 
choose between Turkey and Cyprus, its preference would be Cyprus. It was, 
therefore, clear that there was a limit for the Soviet Union on its developing relations 
with Turkey. This situation forced the Soviet Union to support for Makarios against a 
Greek conspiracy to overthrow him.224 In fact, if Makarios was overthrown and a 
pro-Enosis president came to power, this might have left the Soviet Union hopeless 
to protect its vital interests regarding Cyprus.   
Makarios’ policy of developing relations with Moscow to protect the 
independence of the island worried the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots 
thought that Makarios would turn the island into a “Cuba of Mediterranean”. It was 
also uttered by the Cypriot General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Veniamin, in the case of a Turkish invasion, the Soviet Union would offer immediate 
naval intervention against the Turks. The opening of Cyprus ports to Soviet ships had 
been also discussed for this purpose in 1971. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots 
witnessed the visit of a Soviet ship to Paphos and they averred that the ship was 
unloaded in a suspicious manner. In other words, the Turkish Cypriots implied that 
the ship might have been loaded with Soviet weapons.225 Four days later after this 
claim, it was stated in Pravda, that the Greek Cypriots considered the existence of 
the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean as an assurance of their territorial 
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integrity and their independence. To be sure, this explanation was not given by a 
Soviet authority but it was allowed to be published in Pravda.226  It is important to 
mention that Makarios denied the allegations about the opening of Cyprus ports to 
Soviet ships. In his interview with Robert Southgate of Independent Television News 
(ITN) on 22 September 1971, in response to a question, “Would you allow Soviet 
ships to use Cyprus ports?” Makarios said that “if such a question arose, I would 
consider it, having in mind primarily the interests of Cyprus”.227 
By 1971, the threat of communism on the island increased the anxiety of the 
NATO countries. Indeed, in the election of 1971, AKEL received 30 % of the total 
votes. AKEL’s achievement in the election and the progress of the communist 
movements on the island was a signal of AKEL’s possible victory in the next 
election. If AKEL was going to win the next election, the island might pass into the 
hands of Moscow. At a NATO meeting held in Lisbon in May 1971, Makarios was 
criticized for his ignoring the communist threat on the island. The US also decided 
that some measures had to be taken against Makarios. In fact, if the Turkish 
government had taken action to do this, it might have stirred the Soviet Union. As 
recalled, the Soviet Union declared that if Turkey attacked the island, the Soviet 
Union would confront the Turks. There was, therefore, only one way to overthrow 
Makarios and that was through the resurrection of EOKA on the island. This required 
the returning of General Grivas to the island. Grivas landed on the island in 28 
August 1971 and he immediately embarked on the establishment of new version of 
EOKA, known as EOKA-B. 228  
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On 6 October 1971, in an article in Pravda, titled “Clouds over Cyprus”, the 
Soviet Union criticized the return of Grivas to Cyprus. The reasons of his return, 
supposedly, were not only to provoke an inter-communal conflict, but also to fight 
against Makarios’ government. Upon Grivas return, Makarios warned that a civil war 
in Cyprus might occur. 229  
Makarios’ good terms with the Eastern Bloc made him increasingly suspect 
on the eyes of the USA. The President of the USA, Richard Nixon, backed the Greek 
junta which engaged in Makarios’ elimination.230 The anxiety of the Greek junta 
about Makarios was that the latter would turn the island into “Mediterranean Cuba”. 
By 1969, both the USA and the Greek junta came to understand that there would be 
no progress in terms of solving the Cyprus question in favor of the NATO as long as 
Makarios was in power.231 In AKEL’s publication, Haravghi, it was claimed that at 
the NATO summit in Rome, the USA, Britain, Greece and Turkey agreed on a new 
plan for Cyprus, which anticipated joining the island to NATO. If Makarios insisted 
on being rejecting the plan, he would be overthrown.232 In fact, the first attempt to 
eliminate Makarios came on 8 March 1970 while he was being taken to a memorial 
service at a monastery. His helicopter was shot down but Makarios walked away.233 
This clearly proved the break up of two camps among Greek Cypriots. Makarios, 
who was convinced that pro-Enosis circles would eliminate him, established a 
Tactical Police Reserve against the pro-Enosis circles and received respectable 
amount of arms from Czechoslovakia for the equipping of this new agency.234   
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The EOKA-B attacks on Makarios’ government intensified during March and 
April 1973. The most remarkable one of these occurred when a bomb was thrown 
into the house of the Minister of Interior of Cyprus, George Ioannides. Moreover, on 
8 April 1973 there were thirty-two expulsions in Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca.235 
At the end of June 1973, forty pro-Enosis people were arrested and charged with 
attempting to overthrow the government. With the aim of retaliation on 27 July 1973 
a police station in Limassol was bombed and the Minister of Justice, Hristos Vakis, 
was kidnapped.236 On 7 October 1973, Makarios was exposed to a mined aggression. 
However, this assassination attempt to Makarios also resulted in failure.237  
On 27 January 1974, General Grivas, the leader of the EOKA-B, died. 
Shortly afterwards, President Makarios granted an amnesty for the detained EOKA-B 
members. The announcement of the amnesty was welcomed by the Soviet Union as 
evidence of the strong will of the government to end terrorist activities on the island. 
In concert with the Soviet Union, AKEL also backed Makarios’ decision. The party 
stated that this amnesty was the manifestation of Makarios’ good will to reduce the 
tension on the island.238 Indeed, it was expected that the announcement of the 
amnesty for detained members of EOKA would led to a drop off in violence on the 
island. However, the local leaders of EOKA-B declared in March 1974 that they 
were not going to make use of the amnesty. On the contrary, they would enter into a 
new phase of terror and violence on the island for carrying out the goal of Enosis.239 
The refusal of amnesty by EOKA-B aggravated the Soviet Union. In a 
meeting on 18 March 1974, Semyonov, the Soviet charge d’affaires in London, 
inferred to the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Relations 
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that Makarios’ government was making resolute efforts to normalize the tension on 
the island, to consolidate the independence of the island, and to find a solution to the 
Cyprus problem in conformity with the interests of both communities of the island. 
Semyonov claimed that although Makarios was attempting to normalize the situation, 
NATO and pro-Enosis circles were provoking the inhabitants of the island to hamper 
the Makarios’ government efforts.240 On the other hand, the Turkish government did 
not agree with Semyonov. On 26 March 1974 the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan 
Güneş, argued that the Soviet comments were based on false intelligence. Güneş 
stated that President Makarios did not intend to preserve the independence of Cyprus. 
His main goal was the realization of Enosis. Güneş also suggested that Soviet Union 
should have supported the Turkish Cypriots if it was in favor of independence.241  
In the meantime, among Makarios’ supporters there was a growing concern 
about the possibility of a coup d’état. On 30 March 1974, in an article, published in 
Izvestiia titled “Dangerous Plan For Cyprus”, it was stated that illegal organizations 
on the island were stocking arms and they would use for a coup d’état.242 On 5 April 
1974, the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Veniamin, 
and the British ambassador in Nicosia, D.M. Day, discussed the former’s visit to 
Moscow on 21 March 1974. Veniamin told to the ambassador that, according to the 
Soviet intelligence services both in Nicosia, and Athens, the Greek government 
directly supported the EOKA-B. He stated that, all this evidence dramatically 
exposed the accuracy of allegations of a military coup against Makarios.243 
These allegations led to Makarios to send a letter to the Greek Prime 
Minister, Adamantios Androutsopoulos, at the beginning of the July 1974. Makarios 
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criticized the Greek government for its provoking unrest on the island by backing the 
EOKA-B both financially and militarily.244 By the way, the Soviet government was 
sure that the Greek junta, with the support of the USA, would attempt a military coup 
in the near future. Therefore, on 12 June 1974, the Soviet Union recommended 
AKEL that it should support the inter-communal negotiations, and cooperate with the 
Turkish Cypriots to preserve the independence. In the 15th Congress of AKEL, the 
party also took the same line as Moscow. The party criticized EOKA-B and declared 
that Cyprus would not be turned into a NATO military base.245 The Greek junta 
made an attempt on the state on 15 July 1974 which seemed to be successful at first. 
Makarios had to leave the island for London and the government passed to a puppet 
government of the Greek junta under the leadership of General Nikos Sampson.  
The first reaction of the Soviet Union indicated that it was disconcerted by 
the coup. On 16 July 1974, at his meeting with the British Prime Minister, the Soviet 
ambassador in London, N.M. Lunkov, stated that the Greek government was behind 
the coup. He added that the Greek government was mainly responsible for what had 
happened on the island.246  
The 15 July coup d’état led to the establishment of a puppet government 
directed by the Greek junta. This impelled the Turkish government to initiate a 
military intervention. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, labeled this 
military intervention as “the Peace Operation”. He claimed that the Turkish 
government launched a military intervention in order to restore not only the 
independence of Cyprus, but also the rights of all Cypriots and to protect the 
territorial integrity of the island. 247 
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By July 1974, the main objective of the Soviet Union was the maintenance of 
the Makarios’ government and preserving the independence of Cyprus. This was the 
essential factor why the Soviet government did not condemn the Turkish military 
intervention on 20 July 1974. Soviet officials believed that the Turkish intervention 
would result in overthrowing of the Sampson government and provided an 
opportunity to restore Makarios’ government on the island. In addition, the Soviet 
Union did not intend for a military intervention on the island. By 2 August 1974, a 
Soviet naval vessel was anchored at a discrete distance from Cyprus.248 
After the Turkish military intervention, a conference was gathered in Geneva 
with the participation of the British, Greece,249 Turkey, and representatives of the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. However, this conference ended in failure and the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, ordered a second military intervention. This 
intervention differed from its predecessor. The Turkish Prime Minister explained that 
the aim of the operation was “to end the long sufferings of the Turkish Cypriots and 
to enable them to live freely in their own soil”.250 This meant the partition of the 
island rather than the protection of its territorial integrity.       
The Soviet government’s statement on second Turkish military intervention 
to Cyprus was published in Soviet Central Press on 23 August 1974. This time the 
Soviet government condemned this military operation and perceived it to be a part of 
the plan which was prompted by the ‘bellicose’ NATO circles to turn the island into 
a NATO base. The Soviet government alleged that the Turkish military intervention 
made the Cyprus question more complex and suggested that an international 
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government should be put in place under the auspice of the UN.251 According to the 
Soviet proposal the negotiations would concern on three basic articles: the protection 
of the independence and the territorial integrity of the island, the withdrawal of 
foreign troops from the island, and the seeking of new guarantees for the 
independence of Cyprus.252 However, this proposal was never negotiated because the 
Turkish government did not accept it. Instead, the Turkish government was in favor 
of bilateral negotiations with Greece. The Turkish government believed that the 
inclusion of other states in the negotiation process would impede the solution of the 
Cyprus dispute.253 
The Soviet Union’s proposal to find a solution to the Cyprus question was not 
accepted. Instead, by December 1974, the bilateral negotiations between the Turkish 
and Greek governments initiated. In the same month, Makarios also returned to the 
island and he grounded a general amnesty for anyone who joined the 15 July coup 
d’état. He also tried to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots. However, his efforts 
were not sufficient to heal the wounds of the Turkish Cypriots which had resulted 
from their past experiences and a practical solution to the Cyprus question could not 
be found. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Russia indirectly had affected the fate of Cyprus twice since the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. At first, the Russian expansionism during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century was the main factor for the British Empire to settle on 
Cyprus. Under the veil of supporting the Ottoman Empire against Russian threat, the 
British Empire “leased” Cyprus from the Ottomans after Russo-Turkish Wars of 
1877-78. In accordance with the articles of Cyprus Convention of 1878, Cyprus was 
leased to the British Empire until the Russian threat to Asian provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire was managed to abolish. However, in reality, the British intention 
was the permanent settlement on the island, not temporarily. The deliberation 
between the leading figures of the British politics in 1870’s on the acquisition of 
Cyprus and the British administrative policy in Cyprus in the following years clearly 
revealed this.   
The root of the Cyprus problem was the idea of Enosis which was produced 
by Hellenic nationalism in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. However, the 
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British administrative practices strengthened the roots of the problem and made it an 
insoluble one. The British practices not only impeded the growth of fraternity 
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also reasoned the lack of modernization 
process and the growth of extreme nationalism on the island. The different 
approaches of the two main communities on the Turkish Independence War of 1919 - 
1922 was the most remarkable example of this extreme nationalism which was the 
main factor for the lack of modernization.  
The ending of the Second World War entailed the decolonization period. 
Although the imperialist powers withdrew from their colonies one by one, this was 
not the case for Cyprus. Cyprus was one of the strategically important territories for 
the Western Bloc in their struggle against communism. Furthermore, the British 
withdrawal from Egypt after the Suez Crisis increased this strategic importance. 
Thus, once again, Russia indirectly affected the fate of the island, but this time under 
the cloak of communist threat. In fact, the British administration enforced strict 
regulations to prevent the emergence of communism on the island. The only 
communist formation, AKEL, which would act as a spokesman of the Soviet Union 
in 1960’s in Cyprus, was also banned in 1955 until 1959. 
The Greece application to the UN for the solution of the Cyprus problem in 
1954 and the foundation of the EOKA a year later to support Greek thesis with 
violent actions deepened the Cyprus problem. These Greek efforts led to the Turkish 
annoyance. Of course, this was a danger for the possibility of a split in the NATO’s 
southern flank. 
Although Britain had no intention to withdraw from Cyprus in 1950’s, the 
annoyance between Turkey and Greece forced Britain to gather a conference in 
London in 1955. In fact, the United States was also uncomfortable owing to the 
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Cyprus problem because of its potential to create a split in NATO’s southern flank. 
This impelled the US to recommend the British government to find a solution to the 
problem. This process, initiated with the London Conference in 1955, ended with the 
signing of the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, which made Cyprus an 
independent state as at 16 August 1960.  
The Zurich and London Agreements created only a toy-republic. As a matter 
of fact, from 1960 to 1974 there were main three crises on the island between the 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However, the independent status of Cyprus opened its 
borders for the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union, as a result of its logical change 
towards the Third World Countries after the death of Stalin, became increasingly 
interested in Cyprus as at 1960. The main target of the Soviet policy was to prevent 
the re-settling of NATO powers on the island and made Cyprus a non-aligned 
country having friendly relations with the Soviet Union. To accomplish this, at first, 
in 1964 and onwards, the Soviet Union aimed at the internationalization of the 
Cyprus problem through carrying it to the UN. Thus, the Soviet Union achieved to 
impede the solving of the Cyprus dispute within the framework of NATO. In fact, 
thanks to its support to the President Makarios, the Soviet Union provided the 
landing of the United Nation Peace Operation Forces in 5 March 1964 on the island, 
instead of the NATO troops.  
As a second step to realize its aim regarding Cyprus, the Soviet Union 
endeavored to keep Cyprus as an independent state. This also led to the development 
of relations between the Soviet Union and the President Makarios who wanted to 
hinder the NATO intervention in Cyprus’ internal affairs and to balance the Greek 
military junta pressures for the declaration of Enosis as soon as possible after the 
1967 crisis. 
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Although the intersecting interests of the Soviet Union and Makarios 
developed Cyprus relations with the communist world, this strategy made Makarios 
as a persona non grata in the eyes of the West Bloc countries. Nevertheless, mainly 
thanks to the Soviet support, Makarios managed to keep his position until the coup 
d’état in15 July 1974.   
In fact, within the context of the Cold War, the essential political aim of the 
two blocs was to reduce or to vanish another’s influence in the Third World 
Countries. This was also the case for Cyprus. The Soviet Union followed policies to 
decrease or to abolish the influence of NATO on the island and, if possible, to 
exclude NATO from the solution process of the Cyprus problem. The process, from 
1960 to 1974, indicated that the Soviet Union seemed to be successful to accomplish 
its aims regarding Cyprus. 
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